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CAN SOMETHING THIS EASY, QUICK, AND PROFITABLE
ALSO BE FAIR? RUNAWAY CIVIL FORFEITURE STUMBLES
ON THE CONSTITUTION
MARY M. CHEH*

I. INTRODUCTION

For law enforcement, civil forfeiture must seem too good to be true.
On the bare-bones showing of probable cause, the government can seize
any property thought to be proceeds of a crime or suspected of being used
or intended for use in criminal activity. 1 The government has confiscated

items such as a car driven to a meeting where criminal activity was

discussed, 2 a boat leased to an individual who brought a small amount of

marijuana on board,3 a house in which one family member peddled

narcotics, 4 and an entire business where illegal acts occurred in one

aspect of its operations. 5

* Professor of Law, National Law Center, The George Washington University. I
would like to thank my research assistant, Thomas Olivier, for his invaluable research
help.
1. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (the government's civil
money laundering forfeiture provision); 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)
(authorizing the civil forfeiture of property connected to narcotics activity). Forfeiture
is authorized in more than 140 federal statutes and most states have one or more laws
permitting forfeiture. STEVENL. KESSLER, CIVILAND CRUMNALFORFErrURE: FEDERAL

AND STATE PRACnCE § 2.01, at 2-1 (1994).
2. See United States v. 1990 Toyota 4Runner, 9 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 1993). The
court affirmed the forfeiture of a car under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), reasoning:
In order to import the heroin into the United States and place it in Oloko's [the
conspirator's] possession, someone had to go to Manila, get it, and bring it
back. In order for someone to go to Manila for this purpose, arrangements for
the trip had to be made .

. .

. In order to make these arrangements, the

conspirators had to meet, and Oloko's presence at the meeting was
"facilitated" by the Toyota, his mode of conveyanceto and from the meeting.
Id. at 652.
3. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686-88 (1974)
(affirming forfeiture of a yacht under a Puerto Rico statute).
4. See United States v. 5000 Palmetto Drive, 928 F.2d 373, 374 (11th Cir. 1991)
(holding that a house, seized pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), must be returned to the
claimant because she was an innocent owner).
5. See United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 880 (2d Cir. 1990),
(upholding the forfeiture of a building seized pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991).
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Typically the government can effect its seizure without notice to the
owner and without giving the owner a prior opportunity to object.6 The
owner need not have been charged or convicted of a crime-either at the
time of seizure or ever.7 Alternatively, the seizure can come long after

conviction, even years after the defendant has served his sentence. 8 '

Once property is seized, the law effectively presumes that the property

is proceeds or an instrument of criminal activity. The owner shoulders the
burden of proving the property's "innocence." 9 To make this showing,

the owner not only must pay the costs and expenses associated with a legal
proceeding, he usually must do without his property in the meantime even
as the government dallies. 10
6. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. §§ 1609-1615 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (U.S. Customs
Service procedures for seizure, forfeiture, and recovery of seized property). But see
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993) (requiring
prior notice and opportunity to be heard before government can seize real property).
7. Most people who lose property through civil forfeiture are never charged with
a crime. And, under the fiction that it is the property that is guilty or tainted, they need
not be. See, e.g., The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14-15 (1827) (explaining that
a criminal conviction is irrelevant to civil forfeiture because forfeiture reaches property
and does not depend on the owner's guilt or innocence). Modem cases are in accord.
E.g. United States v. 7715 Betsy Bruce Lane, 906 F.2d 110, 111-12 (4th Cir. 1990) ("In
civil forfeiture cases, property is subject to forfeiture 'even if its owner is acquitted
of-or never called to defend-criminal charges.'") (quoting United States v. 3120
Banneker Drive, N.E., 691 F. Supp. 497, 499 (D.D.C. 1988)).
8. See Good, 114 S. Ct. at 497 (seizure of a residence four-and-one-half years after
drugs were found on defendant's property and after defendantwas sentenced and released
from jail).
9. Once probable cause is established, the burden shifts to the claimant to
demonstrateby a preponderanceof the evidence that the property was not associated with
criminal activity, or that the claimant is an "innocent owner." See, e.g., United States
v. 5 Bell Rock Rd., 896 F.2d 605, 606 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. 1980 Bertram
58' Motor Yacht, 876 F.2d 884, 888 (lth Cir. 1989). The claimant first must prove
that he has a sufficient interest in the property to have standing. See, e.g., 5000
PabnettoDrive, 928 F.2d at 375. To be an innocent owner, the claimant must prove that
the underlying criminal activities were committed without his knowledge or consent. 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988).
10. See United States v. $8850, 461 U.S. 555 (1983). The Court held that the
government's 18-month delay in filing a civil forfeiture proceeding did not violate the
claimant's right to due process. However, it stated that a delay becomes unreasonable
when the government fails to satisfy the test'applied in speedy trial cases as announced
in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). This flexible test balances (1) whether the
delay is reasonable given its length; (2) the government's reasons for the delay; (3)
whether and when the claimant asserted his rights; and (4) prejudice to the claimant. Id.
at 530; $8850, 461 U.S. at 564.
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The resolute and well-heeled owner can persist but, if he is somehow
involved in wrongdoing, he also risks losing his privilege against self-

incrimination.

Any testimony in defense of the property can be used

against him in a later criminal trial." Moreover, he faces pressure-and

the greater the value of the property, the greater the pressure-to sacrifice
the property in return for a "deal" with prosecutors to avoid criminal
charges.1
With a device so congenial, it is no surprise that government
forfeitures are at an all-time high. Both in the value of property seized
and the number of actions filed, the pace is dramatic and accelerating.
The federal government effected 35,295 seizures of property in 1991, up
eighteen times in six years."3 According to figures provided by the
Justice Department's Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture, net deposits
in the Asset Forfeiture Fund grew from $93.7 million in 1986 to $643.6

million, $531 million, and $555.7 million in 1991, 1992 and 1993,
respectively." State and local law enforcement agencies have been busy
too.
But forfeitures are not popular just because they are quick and

easy-they are also highly profitable.

In most forfeiture regimes, law

enforcement agencies may sell what they seize and keep the proceeds. 5

11. See, e.g., United States v. Parcels of Land, 903 F.2d 36, 44 (1st Cir. 1990)
(explaining that courts should try to preserve a claimant's privilege but specifying no
particular methods of doing so); see also United States v. Premises Located at Route 13,
946 F.2d 749, 756 (11th Cir. 1991) (permitting exception to general rule that adverse
inferences can be drawn from failure to testify in civil cases if defendant actually faces
choice of waiving privilege or losing the civil case).
12. See, e.g., Martin L. Haines, Prosecutors& CriminalsSharing Wages ofCrime,
N.J. L.J., Oct. 19, 1992, at 17. See also United States v. 1985 Mercedes-Benz300SD,
14 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that after the defendant accepted a plea
bargain, the government dropped the criminal charges and pursued a forfeiture claim).
13. See David A. Kaplan, Where the InnocentLose, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 4, 1993, at
42.
14. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR ASSET FoRFErruRE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JuSTICE ASSET FORFEITuRE PROGRAM: FISCAL YEAR
1993, at 15 (1994) [hereinafter 1993 ANNUAL REPORT].
15. The most significant change in the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, Pub. L. No.
98-473, §§ 301-02, 98 Stat. 1837, 2040-57 (1984) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 524 (1988
& Supp. V 1993)), was the change from depositing forfeited amounts into the general
treasury to earmarking forfeited amounts exclusively for law enforcement. See 28
U.S.C. § 524(c).
Under federal forfeiture laws, the United States government holds property in two
stages. The first stage is seizure pending forfeiture. The government holds property
pending a final order of forfeiture through administrative or judicial action. Months may
elapse between seizure and a final order and, during that time, the United States
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The more they confiscate, the more they get. As a result, a significant

portion of law enforcement revenue now depends on aggressive and
frequent pursuit of forfeitable property.16 For example, since 1985, the
federal government has given $1.2 billion to state and local police and has
provided $540 million to build prisons.

7

According to a former head of

the Justice Department's Asset Forfeiture Section, the department's
"marching orders" were: "Forfeit, forfeit, forfeit.

Get money, get

money, get money.""
Can a device this easy, quick and profitable also be fair? In a word,
no. Abuses abound. For example, in South Dakota, a couple permitted
a friend to visit, knowing he possessed thirty-nine marijuana seedlings. 19

Marshals Service is responsible for the property. The government's inventory of
property seized pending forfeiture had grown to $1.9 billion at the end of 1993. 1993
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 20.
The second stage is disposal of forfeited property. The government has several
options. It may deposit the net cash and proceeds from the sale of property into the
Asset Forfeiture Fund. The Asset Forfeiture Fund is an account in the Treasury
Department that holds forfeited cash and property proceeds. See 28 U.S.C. § 524(c).
In 1993, net deposits totaled $555,707,039. 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 14, at
38. The net amount subtracts about $20 million paid to other federal agencies which do
not participate in the Fund.
The government may also retain forfeited property for official use or transfer it to
another federal agency or any state or local law enforcement agency that participated in
the seizure of the property. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). In 1993,
the federal government retained $12.8 million of conveyances and other property for
official use and transferred $10.2 million to state and local agencies. 1993 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 14, at 17.
Finally, the government destroys contraband forfeited property such as illegal drugs.
See 21 U.S.C. § 881(f)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
16. See, e.g., John T. McQuiston, Official's Use of Seizure Law Is Questioned,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1992, at B1, B2 (reporting that through aggressive pursuit of
forfeiture, the District Attorney of Suffolk County, New York, added more than $3
million to his budget between 1990 and 1992). The asset forfeiture unit of the State
Attorney's Office in Connecticut reported its recent forfeiture tallies as follows: 1593
forfeiture cases involving $2.2 million in seized cash, more than 160 vehicles, and 17
parcels of real property. State Roundup, CIviL REMEDiES IN DRUG ENFORCEMENT REP.
(National Ass'n of Att'ys Gen., Washington, D.C.), Feb.-Mar.1992, at 21. The Los
Angeles County Sheriffs Department acknowledged seizing more than $151.4 million
in cash between 1988 and 1993. Ex-Sargeant Sentenced, Alleges Misconduct, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 1993, at B1.
17. See Naftali Bendavid, Asset Forfeiture, Once Sacrosanct, Now Appears Ripe
for Reform, LEGAL TIm, July 5, 1993, at 1, 20.
18. Id. at 21 (quoting Michael F. Zeldin, former director of the U.S. Department
of Justice Criminal Division's Asset Forfeiture Office).
19. See Kaplan, supra note 13, at 42.
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After the friend left with the seedlings, the police searched the premises
and found a trace of marijuana and a marijuana butt in a car belonging to
the couple's daughter.' The police seized the house.2" In California,
a couple sold their $289,000 home to a man later convicted of a federal
crime.' The couple took back a $160,000 note secured by the home.'
The government later seized the house and the couple waged a ten year
court battle to recover the property.' Eventually the couple prevailed,
but they were near bankruptcy and, after ten years, the house was so
badly damaged that the couple ended up taking a loss.' In various drug
stings, police agents have suggested that the informant/buyers arrange
their purchases in homes or condominiums knowing this would permit
The police have set up drug sales
seizure of the seller's real estate.'
in which anyone who drove by and purchased immediately lost his car.'
Of course government confiscation of property is not always unfair.
But fairness and constitutionality depend on the reason for the taking, the
nature and amount of property seized, and the procedures used to

accomplish the seizure.
Modem forfeiture is justified as a means of taking the profit out of
crime and as a device to destroy criminal "enterprises,"'

that is, any

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See John Enders, ForfeitureLaw Castsa Shadow, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1993,
at B3.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., United States v. 41430 DePortola Rd., No. 91-55099, 1992 U.S.
App. LEXIS 6584, at *3 (9th Cir. 1992) (defending party claimed he was entrapped to
commit the crime at a particular location).
27. See, e.g., Fred Strasser, ForfeitureIsn't OnlyforDrug Kingpins, NAT'L L.J.,
July 17, 1989, at 1, 26 (describing car seizing techniques of the Broward County,
Florida, Sheriff's Office).
28. The term criminal "enterprise" usually is associated with criminal forfeiture.
This article deals with civil, not criminal forfeiture. The Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 901-02, 84 Stat. 941
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) and the
Controlled Substances Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-413, §§ 100-709, 84 Stat. 1242
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) (the "Kingpin
Statute") provide for criminal forfeiture of illegal enterprises. Criminal forfeitures are
in personamproceedings instituted as part of the criminal case against a defendant. The
forfeiture affects only the defendant's interest in the property. The defendant enjoys all
rights recognized in criminal cases, such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt. And,
generally, property may not be adjudged forfeit until the defendant is convicted of the
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business, association, cartel, or concerted action that tends to continue

operating even if involved individuals are jailed.

These are laudable

objectives that appeal to good common sense and elementary principles of
morality. It is the essence of justice to deprive a criminal of his booty and
to destroy what are, in effect, nests of criminal activity.

Laws might have been drafted to achieve just these goals while
respecting due process of law and other constitutional rights. Instead,
modem forfeiture laws simply borrow from the ancient practices and
historical uses of forfeiture. These practices and uses rest on different
premises and largely ignore the individual's interests in seized items.
Historically, forfeiture rested on the irrational and superstitious idea
that property which caused harm was guilty and should be destroyed."
Its scope expanded over time to include seizure of property as summary
punishment for possessing or trading in articles without government

authority, or for failure to pay government taxes or fees.'

Forfeiture

proceeds also became a significant source of government revenue. As
underlying crime. Yet, civil forfeiture is also designed to take the profits and assets
from criminal businesses. The Department of Justice described the objectives of federal
civil forfeiture as follows:
Property is forfeited to the United States Government if it is determined to be
the tool of or the proceeds of illegal activities such as drug trafficking,
organized crime, and money laundering. Forfeiture deters crime by taking
away the profits of illegal conduct and can immobilize crime syndicates by
stripping away the cars, boats, airplanes, houses, currency and other properties
which are essential to a large-scale criminal enterprise. The objective of
forfeiture is to dismantle drug trafficking rings and other criminal enterprises,
not only by prosecuting and imprisoning the drug kingpins, their top echelons,
money launderers and drug financiers, but also by stripping away the criminal
assets of the illegal organizations. Consequently, the valuable car, boat, or
airplane used to transport illegal drugs can be seized, as well as the luxury
home or the lucrative business, if financed through an illegal source of income.
Seizing criminal assets literally takes the "profit" out of crime.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR ASSET FORFErrURE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT

OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ASSET FORFEITURE PROGRAM: FISCAL YEAR 1992, at
3 (1993) [hereinafter 1992 ANNUAL REPORT].

29. See Calero-Toledov. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-81 (1974)
(discussing the historical background of forfeiture statutes); United States v. United States
Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719 (1971) ("Traditionally, forfeiture actions have
proceeded upon the fiction that inanimate objects themselves can be guilty of
wrongdoing."); see also KESSLER, supra note 1, § 1.02, at 1-3 to 1-6 (discussing the
historical origins of civil forfeiture); Steven L. Schwarez & Alan E. Rothman, Civil
Forfeiture:A Higher Form of Commercial Law?, 62 FORDHAm L. REV. 287, 290-91
(1993) (tracing the historical roots of forfeiture).
30. See Schwarez & Rothman, supra note 29, at 291.
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inherited, the forfeiture remedy treated the property owner as a bystander;

action was pursued directly against the offending property.
When laudable and sensible modem goals were simply hitched to

these ancient, sometimes irrational, and often high-handed practices, abuse
was inevitable. If anything, the amalgam of old theories and new
objectives has produced ever expanding grounds for confiscation and a
virtual smorgasbord of injustices. For example, not only do current laws
permit seizure of the instruments of crime, but they also allow seizure of
any property which was intended to be used in facilitating crime.' Not
only do current laws permit seizure of the profits of crime, but some also
allow seizure of substitute profits and proceedsP and the tracing of
property into the hands of third parties. 4
Until recently, the government has been able to turn back
constitutional challenges to its forfeiture practices. Its chief defense has
rested on longstanding historical practice.35 After all, governments have
been getting away with all sorts of forfeitures-and raising lots of
revenue-for a very long time. Recently, however, the Supreme Court
has begun to strip away the fictions associated with forfeitures and to
apply constitutional limitations.'
In the 1993-94 term, in United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Property,7 the Supreme Court ruled that, absent exigent circumstances,
real property owners are constitutionally entitled to notice and an
31. See

.

32. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1988) (authorizing forfeiture of all property
used or intended for use in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering,
importing, or exporting controlled substances).
33. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 853; N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. &R. § 1311 (McKinney 1988)
(permitting in personam forfeiture against tainted or untainted assets, proceeds or
substituted proceeds).
34. Under the federal drug forfeiture laws, if a person receives property which is
proceeds from a drug transaction, he will lose the property unless he can show that, at
the time he received the property, he had no actual knowledge of facts subjecting the
property to forfeiture. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988). Knowledge can be imputed from
circumstances such as a wife leaving a large amount of money (damages from a personal
injury lawsuit) in the home and her husband later using it for a drug purchase. See
United States v. $44,000, 596 F. Supp. 1308, 1311 (E.D. Mo. 1984).
35. See, e.g., Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
36. See id. at 2812 (holding the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment
applicable in a forfeiture caseinvolving a residence); United States v. James Daniel Good
Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 497 (1993) (ruling that proceduraldue process protections
apply to forfeiture proceedings).
37. 114 S.Ct. 492 (1993).
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opportunity to be heard prior to seizure of their lands or leaseholds.3"
In so holding, albeit by a bare 5-4 majority, the Supreme Court brought
forfeiture squarely within the reach of procedural due process
protections." And in the 1992-93 term, the Supreme Court decided four
forfeiture cases with one in particular, Austin v. United States,'
representing a fundamental shift in thinking about forfeiture. In Austin,
the Court held that even civil forfeitures can impose punishments so
disproportionate to the underlying wrong that they will violate the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.41 This ruling
signalled that the civil nature of a forfeiture proceeding will not insulate
forfeiture actions from the protections of the Excessive Fines Clause, and
by implication, the Double Jeopardy Clause, warrant requirements, and
other constitutional safeguards.
Unfortunately, neither Good nor Austin, by themselves, or together
with the Court's other forfeiture rulings, are enough to corral runaway
forfeiture and its abuses. Thus far, the Court has shown no inclination to
re-examine forfeiture doctrine from top to bottom. Even with the issues
it has confronted, the Court has been too timid to signal precisely how far
it is willing to go and too reluctant to spell out exactly how its rulings
should be applied.42 Nevertheless, these two cases set the stage for a
fundamental shift in the Court's thinking about how the Constitution
applies to civil forfeitures.
Building upon the Supreme Court's first steps, this article attempts to
set out what the reality of forfeiture practice is. As more fully developed
in Part II, this reality rests on a handful of key understandings. First,
forfeiture is a unique and uniquely harsh invasion of an individual's
property interests. Second, as the Court has now essentially recognized,
the civil or criminal nature of a forfeiture proceeding is irrelevant to
application of constitutional protections against excessive fines and other
limits on government overreaching. Third, there is no single all-purpose
38. See id. at 500-01.
39. See id.
40. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993). The other cases were Alexanderv. United States, 113
S. Ct. 2766 (1993) (pertaining to criminal forfeiture of defendant's assets used in adult
entertainment business); United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993)
(regarding the 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) forfeiture of real estate allegedly purchased with
proceeds of drug trafficking); Republic Nat'l Bank of Miami v. United States, 113 S. Ct.
554 (1992) (holding that the Court of Appeals was not divested of jurisdiction by the
United States' transfer of forfeited res from the district).
41. Austin, 113 S.Ct. at 2812.
42. See id. (suggesting but not deciding that double jeopardy applies to some
forfeitures; the Court declined to enumerate the factors which must be weighed to
determine if a forfeiture is excessive).
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rationale for seizure of property. Rather there are multiple and distinct
justifications, and the amount and nature of property seized must be
limited by the justification on which it is based. Fourth, there are no
interests in seized property separate from the individuals who own, use,
or possess the property. It follows that asset seizures, no less than other
government invasions of individual rights, are limited by the full panoply
of due process protections. Finally, permitting police departments and
prosecutors' offices to profit directly from the sale and use of forfeitable
assets undermines fair and evenhanded law enforcement or, at least, the
appearance of such law enforcement.
The balance of the article sketches the kind of substantive and
procedural rules that might emerge from our new-found realism about
forfeiture. In Part I, the article explains how an invigorated excessive
fines and substantive due process analysis can mitigate the harsh and
disproportionate applications of forfeiture. Finally, in Part IV, the article
argues that, under procedural due process, the government must bear the
burden of proof in forfeiture cases and that courts should consider whether
the entire forfeiture process-from bond requirements, time limits, and
standards of proof-falls below minimal norms of fairness. Part IV also
attempts to identify a procedural due process limit on forfeiture schemes
that permit police to keep the money and property they seize. It may be,
however, that these payback schemes precariously walk the line of
constitutionality and that real reform lies in legislative solutions.

II. THE REALrrY OF CIvIL ASSET FORFErruRE
A. The Unique and Severe Nature of Forfeiture
Forfeiture is not an ordinary civil remedy.
Courts routinely
characterize it as "harsh,"'
"oppressive,"'
and "disfavored. " 45
Others have described certain forfeiture practices as official extortion 4
and the entire forfeiture regime as "a draconian punishment that is
virtually bereft of constitutional protections." 47
43. United States v. $31,990, 982 F.2d 851, 856 (2d Cir. 1993).

44. Id.
45. United States v. 384-390 W. Broadway, 964 F.2d 1244, 1248 (1st Cir. 1992).
46. DAvID B. SMiTH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF FoRpErunRE CASES 1.02,
at 1-21 to 1-24 (1994) (describing practices in St. Louis, Missouri; Volusia County,
Florida; and Los Angeles, California, where police seized cars and cash under flimsy
circumstances and owners had option of paying something to get all or a portion of the
property back).
47. George C. Pratt & William B. Petersen, Civil Forfeiturein the Second Circuit,
65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 653, 668 (1991).
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There are several characteristics that mark modem civil asset
forfeiture as a unique and a uniquely severe remedy. First, its use,
although resting on multiple rationales, is typically anchored to the idea
that the property owner participated in, obtained profits from, or
intentionally
or negligently aided others in the commission of crime. The
criminal nexus
carries a taint or stigma that attaches to the property
owner. It explains the courts' frequent characterization of forfeiture as
"quasi-criminal."'
Indeed, it was the Supreme Court's tardy but
welcome acknowledgement that forfeiture is in fact punishment for
blameworthy conduct, a penalty for one's complicity in the criminal uses
of property, that led it to conclude that forfeiture is the constitutional
equivalent of a fine.49
Second, forfeiture, although linked to criminality, is often
disproportionate to the underlying transgression. Whether the nature or
the value of any property seized bears any equivalence to harms caused by
use of the property or to the culpability of the property owner is pure
happenstance. The effects of forfeiture can be unpredictable, accidental,
and often perverse. The inattentive parents who lose an automobile
because50 their teenager carries marijuana in the vehicle can readily attest
to this.
Finally, forfeiture is a confiscation of property and a complete
divestiture of ownership, not a mere restraint on use, temporary loss, or
a device used to satisfy pre-existing debts or secure jurisdiction.
Ownership of property, although subject to wide-ranging restrictions and
even severe regulation, is a basic and fundamental liberty interest.
Forfeiture extinguishes ownership even in real property and even in one's
home. In this regard, the analogy of forfeiture to fines, while apt, is
inadequate to capture the severity of forfeiture. Forfeiture is to fines what
capital punishment is to incarceration.

48. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 632 (1886); United States v.
$191,910, 16 F.3d 1051, 1063 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Riverbend Farms, Inc.,
847 F.2d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 1988).
49. See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993) (holding that
forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and (7) constitutes punishment for an offense).
50. See, e.g., United States v. 1978 Chrysler Le Baron Station Wagon, 648 F.
Supp. 1048, 1051 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (affinming forfeiture of the claimant's car under 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) when he loaned it to his son who used it to transport drugs; the court
rejected the statutory innocent owner defense because the claimant knew his son had a
criminal record); see also Kaplan, supra note 13, at 42 (reporting on the government
seizure of a 1987 Oldsmobile because the police said the owner's son drove it to a local
Sears store where he allegedly shoplifted a pair of pants).
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B. Forfeiture Can Be a Civil Remedy but the Significance of
the Civil/CriminalLabel is Limited
As harsh and oppressive as civil asset forfeiture is, it does not follow
that forfeiture must be deemed a criminal proceeding for constitutional
purposes. Although statutes could limit forfeiture to criminal proceedings
and currently some types of forfeitures can be effected only in criminal
cases,5 1 the primary determinant of whether a proceeding is criminal or
civil is the legislature's classification of the remedy as one or the other.
Some commentators argue that, because forfeitures involve harsh
punishments for behavior tied to criminal activity, they are criminal cases.
If so viewed, all constitutional protections associated with criminal
proceedings would apply. A property owner would be entitled to a
presumption of innocence, adjudged guilty under a reasonable doubt
standard, protected against double jeopardy, and so on. This line of
argument is appealing because it appears to offer a ready-made solution
to some of the excess and abuse of current forfeiture practice. Yet it rests
on an incomplete view of what makes a proceeding criminal. Moreover,
it vests too much significance in the criminal/civil label. As the Supreme
Court has made plain, many constitutional provisions including double
jeopardy, excessive fines,52 protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures,53 and the privilege against self incrimination, once thought to
apply only in criminal cases also apply in civil cases.'
A forfeiture proceeding can appear similar to a criminal proceeding
in a number of ways. Like a criminal case, some forfeitures are designed
to punish, involve sanctions equivalent to criminal fines, and may
stigmatize the individual for involvement with criminal conduct. But
criminal cases are more than just proceedings that impose monetary
punishments or that somehow link a person to criminal behavior.
Criminal cases are particular processes to adjudge someone guilty or not
guilty of a crime, an act falling outside the boundaries of civilized
behavior. Strict procedures such as proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt are used not only to protect the defendant against the magnitude of
a finding of guilt, but also to give, weight and meaning to the judgment
51. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (RICO criminal enterprise
forfeiture).
52. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812 (1993).
53. Camara v. Municipal Ct. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967).
54. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715,721-22 (1971);
see Mary M. Cheh, ConstitutionalLimits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal
Law Objectives: Understandingand Transcendingthe Criminal-CivilLaw Distinction,42
HAsTiNGs L.J. 1325, 1384-89 (1991) (discussing how privilege is applied in forfeiture
cases).
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that particular behavior constitutes a crime. Criminal cases are criminal

cases precisely because the society, through the legislature, has labeled

them as such and, being so labeled, they must follow particular procedures
to protect the defendant and to give life and significance to the ceremonial

aspect of guilt adjudication. There is, of course, a circularity here in that
criminal cases trigger certain procedures, but the procedures

themselves-trial by jury, guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, right to

appointed counsel-mark the proceeding as criminal.55 In the end, if a
legislature identifies a proceeding as civil, it will be so regarded unless the
proceeding so nearly tracks a criminal case that it is its functional
equivalent or unless it leads to punishments, like incarceration or loss of
citizenship, that necessarily bespeak societal condemnation.56
Happily, the criminal/civil distinction is not as constitutionally
significant as some have supposed. Unless a constitutional provision is

expressly confined to criminal prosecutions, the Supreme Court looks past
the label and asks whether the purposes of the particular constitutional

safeguard are served by applying it in a civil case.5

Following this

approach, the Court has held that the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to

civil fines and punitive drug taxes imposed after a criminal conviction.58

55. See United States v. Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 363 (1984)
(discussing whether procedural mechanisms established by Congress for enforcing
forfeitures under 18 U.S.C. § 924(d) mark the statute as a civil sanction).
56. See id. at 362-63 (questioning whether a forfeiture sanction under § 924(d) was
intended as a punishment and concluding that Congress intended it to be a civil sanction);
Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1986) (stating that where a statutory scheme is
so punitive the proceeding must be considered criminal); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. 144, 149 (1963) (discussing the permissibility of involuntary forfeiture of
citizenship rights); see also Cheh, supra note 54, at 1350 (discussing the similarity of
certain sanctions in criminal and civil proceedings). Many laws provide for either civil
or criminal proceedings against a wrongdoer. Parallel actions can be brought in, for
example, tax, securities law, and environmental cases. See Milton Pollack, ParallelCivil
and Criminal Proceedings, 129 F.R.D. 201 (1989); Carol E. Longest, Note, Parallel
Civil and Criminal Proceedings,24 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 855 (1987).
57. See, e.g., Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2806 (1993) ("Mhe
question is not, as the United States would have it, whether forfeiture under §§ 881(a)(4)
and (a)(7) is civil or criminal, but rather whether it is punishment.") (footnote omitted).
58. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989) (distinguishing criminal
from civil is an "abstract approach" perhaps useful in some contexts but "not well suited
to the context of the 'humane interests' safeguarded by the Double Jeopardy Clause's
proscription of multiple punishments.") (quoting United States v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537,
554 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); see also Department of Revenue of Montana
v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (1994) (stating that the "drug tax is a concoction
of anomolies, too far-removed in crucial respects from a standard tax assessment to
escape characterization as punishment for the purpose of Double Jeopardy analysis.").
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It has also held that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to disproportionate
and extreme forfeitures designed to punish for an offense. 9
The Court's sensitivity to the values underlying a particular
constitutional provision, rather than a wooden and formal declaration that
certain constitutional provisions just do not apply to civil cases, tracks the
development of search and seizure doctrine under the Fourth Amendment.
Initially the Supreme Court concluded that non-criminal regulatory
inspection programs like municipal, fire, and health and safety inspections
of homes or businesses "touch at most upon the periphery of the important
interests safeguarded by the Fourteenth [and Fourth] Amendment's
protection against official intrusion . . . . I Later cases, however,
repudiated this notion, and it is now comfortably settled that non-criminal
regulatory or administrative searches fall within the Fourth Amendment's
protections.6 1 This is because the Fourth Amendment's concern with
invasions of privacy and arbitrary governmental intrusions can arise in
both criminal and non-criminal contexts.
In holding the Excessive Fines Clause applicable to forfeitures that
impose punishment, the Court provided a short catalog of constitutional
provisions that may apply to forfeitures.62 Applicable, it noted, are the
Fourth Amendments and the Fifth Amendment's protection against self
incrimination.' Inapplicable are the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause and the due process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.6 The Court acknowledged that it had held double jeopardy not
applicable to certain forfeiture proceedings, 67 but it distinguished its
ruling by observing that the forfeiture at issue served only a remedial, not
59. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812.
60. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 367 (1959).
61. See Seev. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541,546 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Ct.
of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 540 (1967).
62. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2804 n.4.
63. Id. (citing 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 696 (1965);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886)).
64. Id. (citing United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 72122 (1971)). The privilege against self incrimination applies to civil forfeitures even
though the Fifth Amendment is textually limited to "criminal case[s]." Id.
65. Id. (citing United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475, 481 (1896)).
66. Id. at 2804 n.4 (citing Lilienthal's Tobacco v. United States, 97 U.S. 237, 27172 (1878)).
67. Id. (citing United States v. Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 357
(1984)).
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a punitive function.' The Court clearly signalled that, where forfeitures
operate as punishment, the Double Jeopardy Clause will apply.'
Thus, although forfeitures are civil proceedings, constitutional
provisions not clearly limited to criminal prosecutions can and do apply.
Moreover, forfeitures are subject to procedural due process limitations
which, while not as stringent as Fifth and Sixth Amendment criminal
process requirements, can rein in the unfairness of many current forfeiture
regimes.
C. Justifying Forfeiture- Different Property, Different Rationales
Modem civil asset forfeiture applies to several different kinds of
property and rests on a variety of rationales. The three principal forms
of forfeitable property are: contraband, which is property that is a harm
in itself or illegal to possess; proceeds, which includes property that
represents the profits of crime; and instrumentalities, which are properties
that are used, or intended for use, to commit or facilitate a crime. When
the government confiscates property, it may simultaneously pursue more
than one of these forms of assets. For example, when the government
seizes an entire business because of drug dealing on the premises, it may
be seizing the business as an instrumentality because it was the situs of
illegal activity. It may also be seizing business assets as profits of crime
if drug money was funneled back into the purchase of business property.
Ordinarily, little controversy surrounds the seizure of contraband. To
protect public health and morals, the legislature can identify certain
property which, because of public danger or harm, either cannot be
possessed at all or possessed only under strict conditions. Contraband can
include items such as stolen property, illicit drugs, outlawed guns, or
misbranded products.7' A constitutional issue may arise over whether a
legislature may ban simple possession of property which is completely
68. Id. at 2812.
69. See id. at 2805-06. Lower courts have responded to this signal and now apply
double jeopardy analysis in appropriate cases; see infra note 88.
70. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 334(a) (1988) (applying to any article of food, drug, or
cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded while in interstate commerce or while held for
sale); 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 781-782 (1988) (defining the term "contraband article"). The
U.S. Supreme Court has defined contraband as "objects the possession of which, without
more, constitutes a crime." 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699
(1965). The owner has no right to have contraband returned because it is against public
policy to permit possession of the items. Id.
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harmless; such as a spinning wheel.7" But, as long as there is a rational
basis for the law, and as long as the ban on possession does not offend
freedom of expression or freedom of religion (by banning, for example,

certain symbols such as flags or crucifixes), such laws will survive
constitutional challenge.
Seizure of the profits or proceeds of crime is similarly
noncontroversial. The idea of depriving a criminal of the profits of his
wrongdoing is rooted in equity and is morally compelling. The idea that

one should not profit from his own wrong undergirds the familiar
equitable rule that a killer cannot inherit from his victim.' Particular
applications of proceeds forfeiture have, however, raised thorny questions
regarding the calculation of proceeds,' 3 the idea of "substituted
proceeds,"' 4 and separating proceeds from legitimate property.75 One
particularly contentions issue has been seizure of proceeds in the hands of
third parties, especially proceeds paid to defense lawyers.76
71. Recall, however, that in Sleeping Beauty, the king banned all spindles. A witch
had prophesied that Sleeping Beauty would be pricked by a spindle and fall into an
eternal sleep.
72. See, e.g., GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOoERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES § 478, at 152-54 (2d ed. 1978) (discussing the principle that a killer
cannot profit from his crime).
73. See United States v. Milicia, 769 F. Supp. 877, 888-90 (E.D. Pa. 1991), appeal
dismissed, 961 F.2d 1569 (3d Cir. 1992) (calculating a pharmacy's "proceeds" as the
total sales of drugs, 90% of which represented the unlawful distribution of controlled
substances).
74. See KESSLER, supra note 1, § 16.02[2], at 16-9 (discussing the New York
forfeiture statute, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 1310 (McKinney 1988), and the concept
of which items may be the subject of a forfeiture action).
75. See United States v. Pole No. 3172, 852 F.2d 636, 640 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding
that, "the government may have an interest equal only to the portion of the property
acquitted by [the property owner] as a result of mortgage payments."); United States v.
Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1158-61 (2d Cir. 1986) (explaining how to
separate "clean" and "dirty" money commingled in one account and discussing three
possible approaches).
76. Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 622-23 (1989). The
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 301-22, 98 Stat.
1837, 2040-59, makes forfeitable all proceeds and property derived from proceeds that
a defendant obtained from racketeering or continuing criminal enterprise drug activities.
Id. § 302(a)(3). The statute creates a governmental right in such proceeds from the time
of the commission of the offense. Id. § 302(c). A third person who claims a right in
the property that is subject to forfeiture must establish either that she had a superior right
in the property before the defendant committed the crime, or that she was a bona fide
purchaser for value or bona fide donee, and was at the time of purchase or gift
reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture. 21
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The greatest controversy surrounding forfeiture practice is the
confiscation of instrumentalities. The historical justification for the
seizure of instrumentalities was the idea that the property was "tainted"
or "guilty" by virtue of its use in causing harm. But inanimate
property-a car, a condo, a farm-cannot be guilty; only people can be
guilty. Although everyone now recognizes the idea of guilty property as
a fiction, the law still relies on fictions because they serve a purpose.'
We may appropriately ask, what purpose does the fiction of guilty
property serve?
Instrumentality seizures are justified on several grounds. The chief
rationale is that they are a means of stripping criminals of the tools of
their trade and the infrastructure that allows them to operate criminal
businesses or enterprises. Consider the operation of a "chop shop," a
garage outfitted to receive stolen autos and break them down into saleable
component parts. The garage is made to look like a legitimate business,
but the equipment is assembled and used for the illegal activity. Criminal
prosecution of the individuals running the shop might end the operation,
but forfeiture prevents confederates from simply picking up where the
convicts left off. The property, dedicated to a criminal purpose, is taken
out of circulation. In this sense, instrumentality forfeiture can resemble
contraband forfeiture in that there is seizure of property which has, in
effect, become a harm in itself. Property dedicated to criminal purposes
can become analogous to a weapon or a public nuisance. Confiscating
such property is similar to disarming a criminal.
Other rationales for instrumentality forfeiture are less defensible. A
principal aim of instrumentality forfeiture, whether admitted or not, is
punishment and deterrence. The punishment is imposed in addition to any
criminal penalties and is wholly unrelated to whether criminal charges
could be or were brought. For some, the punishment is for engaging in
illegal activity. For others, the punishment is for permitting others, or at
U.S.C. § 853(u)(6) (1988). For commentary on the issue of forfeiture of attorneys' fees,
see Morgan Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys' Fees: Applying an Institutional Role
Theory to Define Individual ConstitutionalRights, 1987 Wis. L. R.V. 1; Richard W.
Mass, Note, ForfeitureofAttorneys'Fees: Should Defendants Be Allowed to Retain the
"Rolls Royce of Attorneys" with the "Fruitsof the Crime"?, 39 STAN. L. REV. 663
(1987); Lisa F. Rackner, Note, Against Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO:
Protecting the ConstitutionalRights of CriminalDefendants, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 124
(1986).
77. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1981) (permitting a
search incident to an arrest to extend to the passenger compartment of a car on the theory
that the arrestee might be able to seize a weapon or destroy evidence-even if that is a
factual impossibility in the circumstances; the fiction is meant to give the police a
generous bright line for applying the doctrine and it avoids the headache of case-by-case
determinations).
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least not preventing others, from engaging in illegal activity.'

Like a

fine-but more draconian-the sting of forfeiture can be severe and

dramatic. Whole parcels of land can be lost because illicit drugs were

present on part of the premises. 9 Owners are at peril for huge losses
unless they take steps to ensure that their property is not the situs or
vehicle for criminality.' Landlords, parents, and businesspeople must

monitor the behavior of tenants, guests in cars, family members in the
home, and anyone who borrows, leases, or otherwise uses their

property."1 If they do not, they may bear a disproportionate share of the

cost of society's war on crime.
The principal flaw in using forfeiture as a form of punishment and

deterrence is that it has no correlation with culpability, and it has almost
no natural boundaries. Almost any punitive action can serve as
punishment or deterrence. For example, forfeiture as punishment need not
stop at property used or intended for use in crime. It also can support
confiscating all property of anyone suspected of engaging in criminal

activity or who permits another to engage in criminal activity.

A

punishment rationale can also justify imposing group penalties. Why not
punish whole neighborhoods where crime flourishes? Group punishment
can be structured to resemble discipline in a military setting, where if one

person in the regiment violates a rule, then all or every tenth soldier in the
unit is punished. So, too, if there is a certain level of criminal activity in

a neighborhood, then every tenth house could be confiscated. This will
encourage wrongdoers to desist and lash the neighbors into a more
committed monitoring role.
78. By authorizing the forfeiture of property acquired knowingly from a drug dealer,
Congress intended to render drug dealers 'criminal economic pariahs.' Moshe Heching,
Note, Civil Forfeiture andthe Innocent OwnerDefense: United States v. 92 Buena Vista
Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993), 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 835, 846 (1993).
79. See United States v. Two Tracts of Real Property, 665 F. Supp. 422, 425-26
(M.D.N.C. 1987) (holding that an entire tract of land is forfeited even though only the
house, pool, and driveway had a connection to the illegal drug activity), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. Reynolds, 856 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1988).
80. See, e.g., United States v. 1990 Toyota 4Runner, 9 F.3d 651, 652 (7th Cir.
1993) (upholding forfeiture of a car driven to a meeting where criminal activity was
discussed); United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 872-73 (2d Cir. 1990)
(upholding forfeiture of a 41-unit apartment building when only 15 units were used for
criminal activity), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991).
81. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 665-67
(1974) (allowing the forfeiture of a yacht leased to someone who brought marijuana on
board); United States v. 5000 Palmetto Drive, 928 F.2d 373, 375 (11th Cir. 1991)
(permitting the seizure of a mother's house because her son was selling cocaine from the
house); 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 872-73.
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Because courts have begun to look closely at forfeitures that punish,
government lawyers are vigorously pressing the argument that forfeiture
is not punitive but "remedial," or restitutionary.'
That is, because
forfeiture is sparked by some underlying criminal activity, seizure of
property which facilitated the crime provides a res out of which the
government can recover its investigation and prosecution costs and society
can recover the costs associated with the crime. The idea borrows from
the use of a "liquidated damages" justification which permits seizures of
property for the payment of customs and tax obligations. It also borrows
from administrative assessments for injuries like fraud, environmental
damage, and securities laws violations.
But civil asset forfeitures never were intended to serve as a form of
restitution nor are they designed to serve that goal. The property owner
owes no money or tax obligation. Nor has he been adjudged guilty of a
specific administrative violation or assessed a monetary penalty for the
actual damage done. Although it may be possible for the government to
obtain a judgment for its expenses (as it may or, for example, when it
incurs costs to rescue mountain climbers who voluntary assume inordinate
risk), and then attach the wrongdoers property, forfeiture does not
establish such a framework. In rejecting the remedial justification in a
recent drug forfeiture case, the Supreme Court stated:
The Government's second argument about the remedial nature of
this forfeiture is no more persuasive. We previously have upheld
the forfeiture of goods involved in customs violations as "a
reasonable form of liquidated damages."
But the dramatic
variations in the value of conveyances and real property under
[the drug forfeiture statute] undercut any similar argument with
respect to those provisions. The Court made this very point
[previously]: the "forfeiture of property . . . [is] a penalty that
ha[s] absolutely no correlation to any damages sustained by
society or to the costs of enforcing the law."'

82. See, e.g., Austinv. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801,2811 (1993) (explaining that
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) are not remedial in purpose); see also
Proportionality/EighthAmendment/Facilitation, QUICK RELEASE (Asset Forfeiture
Office, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Washington, D.C.), June 1993, at 5 ("We believe that in
addition to focusing on the question of whether or not there is a 'substantial connection'
between the violation and the property, government attorneys should consider whether
a particular forfeiture will serve a recognized remedial purpose.").
83. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811 (citations omitted). Some courts have endorsed this
argument. E.g., In re 1632 N. Santa Rita, 801 P.2d 432, 436 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990)
(rejecting claimant's double jeopardy defense).
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Perhaps the most troubling justification for instrumentality forfeiture,
and perhaps for all forfeitures, is the by-product benefits that law

enforcement agencies reap when they keep the property they confiscate.
Of course, law enforcement officials never argue that forfeiture should be
permitted solely because it provides revenue. The government readily
acknowledges, however, that forfeiture revenues are a significant byproduct of their seizure programs, and law enforcement trumpets the
financial success it has had through forfeiture. The direct monetary
benefits have obviously added zeal to efforts to expand the scope of
forfeiture and to apply it aggressively.~"
I.

SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL RULES BASED ON REALITY

Once civil forfeiture is seen for what it is and once the government's
reasons for using it are set out, it becomes possible to sketch the
constitutional rules which should apply to its use.
A. The Excessive Fines Clause
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Austin v. United States
represents an important shift in the Court's thinking about forfeitures.
The Court held that instrumentality forfeiture is subject to the Eighth
Amendment's limit on excessive fines.86 The Court's holding rested on
84. See Bendavid, supranote 17, at 21-22 (citing critics who say asset forfeiture is
conducted to maximize money rather than follow good law enforcement decisions);
Randall Osborne, Police State, RIVERFRONT TrMS, Dec. 12-18, 1990, at 1. In St. Louis
County, the local law enforcement agency seizes cars and then set an amount which, if
paid by the owner, would release the property. Id. at 10. The process was called
"compromise, settlement and release." Id. at 11. In St. Louis County, proceeds from
drug related seizures increased from less than $1000 in 1983 to more than $250,000 in
the first eight months of 1990. Id. at 10; see also SMrrH, supranote 46, at 1-21 to 1-24
(detailing several press accounts of aggressive police pursuit of forfeiture's financial
rewards).
An example of the direct linkage between law enforcement decisions, the
deployment of personnel, and forfeiture assets is found in a memorandum from Acting
Deputy Attorney General Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., to all United States Attorneys. He
exhorted them to make all cases "current," i.e., move them to judgment. Further, he
stated, "Ifinadequate forfeiture resources are available to achieve the above goals, you
will be expected to divert personnel from other activities or to seek assistance from other
U.S. Attorney's Offices, the Criminal Division, and the Executive Office for United
States Attorneys." 37 U.S. ATT'Ys' BuLL. 214 & exh. A (1989).
85. 113 S.Ct. 2801 (1993).
86. Id. at 2812; see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed. .. ").
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two fundamental propositions. First, as discussed, the Court rejected the
idea that the Excessive Fines Clause applies only to criminal cases,
continuing its disregard for the criminal/civil distinction when applying
constitutional protections not expressly confined to criminal cases. ' This
conclusion squarely subjects forfeitures to the limits of other constitutional
provisions not plainly confined to criminal prosecutions, including the
Double Jeopardy Clause and Fourth Amendment protections against

unreasonable searches and seizures."8

Second, the Court pierced a

central fiction of forfeiture and acknowledged the reality that many
forfeitures are forms of punishment and, as punishments, akin to fines,
87. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2804.
88. This is good news not only for policing forfeitures but, in general, for freeing
constitutional analysis from the distortions of the criminal/civil dichotomy. The question
in constitutional analysis must always be the functional one: what actions of government,
what harms to individuals are meant to be prohibited? See Cheh, supranote 54, at 138994 (discussing the constitutional provisions applicable to civil cases).
Lower courts now readily entertain double jeopardy defenses in civil forfeiture
cases, but they are divided over how precisely to apply the defense. Although there is
agreement that a criminal prosecution and civil forfeiture of assets can constitute
successive attempts to punish for the same offense, and thus a violation of double
jeopardy, there is disagreement over what constitutes single or successive proceedings
and what kinds of forfeitures constitute punishment. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit recently held that a criminal proseeution and a parallel civil
forfeiture action are "separate" proceedings for successive prosecution purposes and that
double jeopardy will bar whichever judgment issues second. United States v.
$405,089.23, 33 F.3d 1210, 1218 (9th Cir. 1994). The Second and Eleventh circuits
have held, however, that a criminal prosecution and a contemporaneously conducted civil
forfeiture action constitute a "single coordinated prosecution" for double jeopardy
purposes. United States v. 18755 North Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit has also held,
contrary to conclusions by other courts, that civil forfeiture of proceeds of narcotics
activities under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 501(a)(6), 84 Stat. 1236, 1270 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(6)) is punishment for double jeopardy purposes. Compare United States v.
$405,089.23, 33 F.3d 1210, 1220-21 (9th Cir. 1994) (forfeiture of proceeds constitutes
punishment) with United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 300 (5th Cir. 1994) (forfeiture
of illegal drug proceeds does not constitute punishment). There is a growing need to
harmonize the welter of double jeopardy rulings involving forfeiture and
administrative/regulatory actions-all spawned by the Supreme Court's conclusion in
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989)-that double jeopardy applies to
civil and criminal proceedings. For example, there appear to be a large number of cases
in Arizona, Florida, and Ohio in which defense attorneys have successfully argued, under
double jeopardy principles, that a motorist who administratively lost his license for
failing an alcohol breath test could not later be criminally prosecuted for drunk driving.
James L. Dam, New Drunk DrivingDefense Works in Hundredsof Cases, LAWS. WKLY.
USA, Feb. 27, 1995, at 1.
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The Court recognized that
they can be constitutionally excessive.'
forfeitures can serve multiple purposes, but if they serve to punish, even
if only in part, they will be judged as punishments. '
Regrettably, the Austin majority stopped short of spelling out what
would be an excessive forfeiture. Richard Austin was convicted of
cocaine possession and, thereafter, the United States seized his mobile
home and auto body shop."l The government considered these properties
"instruments" because Austin stored the cocaine in his home and sold it
in his body shop.' The majority, stating that "[p]rudence dictates that
we allow the lower courts to consider [t]he question" of what factors must
be weighed to establish excessiveness, declined to say whether, in these
circumstances, loss of a mobile home and an entire business was excessive
punishment.'m The Court simply reversed the judgment of forfeiture and
remanded the matter to the lower court.
Only Justice Scalia, although agreeing that a remand was in order,
attempted to provide some basis for making an excessiveness calculation.
Justice Scalia stated that the test should not be the conventional one of
comparing the amount of the fine to the nature of the offense.' The
offense, he said, was not relevant to the forfeiture.' 5 The only relevant
consideration was the use to which the property was put. That is, since
instrumentality forfeiture is based on property being put to an unlawful
use, the question has to be "whether the confiscated property has a close
enough relationship with the offense."I6 Thus, it would not be excessive
to seize scales used to weigh illegal drugs even if the scales were
fabulously valuable and the offense was exceedingly minor. It would be
excessive, however, to seize a building where an isolated drug sale
happened to occur.'
Justice Scalia's insight-judging excessiveness by the purpose of
forfeiture-is the right approach, but he failed to take his analysis far
enough. He thereby failed to appreciate that his own analysis will mean,
in fact, that in some cases excessiveness should be judged by comparing
the severity of the forfeiture to the offense.
89. See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2803.
92. Id. at 2811.
93. Id. at 2812.
94. See id. at 2813 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
95. Id. at 2815 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
96. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
97. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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To say that instrumentality forfeiture is designed to confiscate property
put to an unlawful use simply describes the property subject to seizure.
It establishes the statutory basis for seizure, a necessary prerequisite, but
it does not explain what the purpose of seizing that property is. Recall that
the government may have multiple objectives for its seizure. 9" The
government might seize the property because, as constituted and available
to other criminals, it is a harm in itself. Or it might seize the property
because it seeks a res out of which to satisfy direct claims from persons
harmed by the owner's unlawful conduct or the actual use of the property.
Or, as is most likely the case, the seizure is a means to punish the owner
for the underlying criminal conduct. And, if the forfeiture is meant to
punish the individual for underlying behavior, the excessiveness
calculation must compare the degree of punishment, that is, the complete
loss of certain property, to the harm done and the level of culpability. In
other words, for some forfeitures, excessiveness will in fact be an
assessment of the "fine" in relation to the offense.
To prevail against a claim of excessiveness, the government has, in
fact, a two-step burden. First, as Justice Scalia implicitly understood, it
must prove a clear and direct statutory basis for its forfeiture.' Is the
seized property contraband, proceeds, or instrumentalities? In each kind
of case, the evidence must show that the property was, in fact, of the
character identified.
For instrumentalities, this will require a
showing-recognized by Justice Scalia-that the property was closely and
directly connected to criminal activity. 1" This can be expressed most
forcefully by requiring the property to be "integral" to the crime."' ° It
should also mean that seized property be limited to that which meets the
definition-only that portion of the property in fact found to be integral to
the crime. This would invalidate, for example, forfeitures of entire tracts
of land
where criminal activity was carried out on a discrete and severable
10 2
part.
98. See supra Part I.
99. See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2815 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
100. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Such
a showing is initially statutory but the tightness of the connection is mandated by the
requirements of due process of law.
101. Some courts have specifically rejected an "integral" or "necessary" tie. E.g.,
United States v. Schifferli, 895 F.2d 987, 990 (4th Cir. 1990) (allowing forfeiture of
dental office used to write illegal prescriptions on more than 40 occasions in four months
even though the offense also was committed elsewhere).
102. See supranotes 78-80 and accompanying text. Due process protections should
be applied to require that statutory language be strictly construed and that the nature of
the property seized be strictly limited to that actually tied to criminality. Such an
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If the government can survive the first burden, it then faces a second.
The amount of property seized must be consonant with and proportionate
to the purpose of the seizure. Initially it must be determined whether the
purpose is remedial or punitive. Strictly limited seizures of contraband
and proceeds are, by definition, remedial."m And remedial seizures are

by definition not excessive. For these seizures step one and step two may
collapse into each other. Again, this is Justice Scalia's approach, but he
failed to account for different rationales of property seizures. Seizures of
instrumentalities, however, can be remedial or punitive. To be remedial,

the seizure must confiscate property which is a harm in itself. Such
property is specially dedicated to criminal uses and, unless seized and

destroyed or sold, lies around like a loaded weapon for confederates to
pick up and use again for criminal purposes. An example might be a
concrete business that rigs bids, buys off officials and corruptly controls
its union workers, in other words, an enterprise constructed and operated

on principles of criminal behavior.
Getting at such property was the original aim and indeed the genius
of modem forfeiture laws. But allegations cannot substitute for proof, and

the government must be pressed to show that this is the true nature of the
property it has seized."' A generalized claim that seizure of facilitation
approach would have reversed a Fourth Circuit ruling that an entire 26-acre property
bisected by a road and taxed as two separate parcels was forfeitable when small drug
sales were effected on only the five-acre portion where a house, barn, and other
buildings were located. See United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1542-43 (4th Cir.
1989).
103. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811; United States v. $21,282, No. 94-1122, 1995 WL
59690, at *1 (8th Cir. Feb. 15, 1995) ("The forfeiture of proceeds of criminal activity
which 'simply parts the owner from the fruits of the criminal activity' does not constitute
punishment and thus does not implicate the Eighth Amendment.") (quoting United States
v. Alexander, 32 F.3d 1231, 1236 (8th Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Assortment of
89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 364 (1984) (discussing how Congress designed forfeiture
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(d) as a remedial sanction). Of course, courts should look closely
to see that the government is, in fact, limiting its seizure to contraband or proceeds.
When a statute defines "proceeds" broadly to include, for example, all money "furnished
or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance" or
"any money used or intended to be used to facilitate a violation" or any property
"involved in" any illegal money laundering transaction, potential forfeitures might easily
encompass more than the profits of crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A); 21 U.S.C. §
881(a)(6); United States v. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d 1210, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 1994)
(concluding that forfeitures under such broadly written statutes necessarily constituted
punishment and not simply the remedial recovery of proceeds).
104. One commentator suggests that the test for what constitutes contraband per se
ought to be whether the property is such that it must be destroyed to prevent harm. See
Tamara R. Piety, Note, Scorched Earth:How the Expansion of CivilForfeitureDoctrine
Has Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 U. MIAMI L. REv. 911, 949 n.186 (1991).

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

property is akin to remedial seizures of contraband will not be enough.
The Supreme Court specifically rejected the government's efforts to seize
an individual's home and business as a form of instrumentality contraband
because drugs were stored and sold there.e 5 The government argued
that it had to seize the property to "remove the 'instruments' of the drug
trade 'thereby protecting the community from the threat of continued drug
dealing. '"o The Court dismissed the argument saying,
Concededly, we have recognized that the forfeiture of contraband
itself may be characterized as remedial because it removes
dangerous or illegal items from society. The Court, however,
previously has rejected government's attempt to extend that
reasoning to conveyances used to transport illegal liquor. In that
case it noted: "There is nothing even remotely criminal in
possessing an automobile." The same, without question, is true
of the properties involved here, and the Government's attempt to
characterize these properties as "instruments" of the drug trade
must meet the same fate ....
"
Other seizures of instrumentalities are species of punishment. When
the drug seller loses his condo, he is being punished for his behavior, or
when the landlord loses his building, he is being punished for looldng the
other way and permitting crime to occur. In such cases, excessiveness
must be assessed in relationship to the level and degree of culpability, the
duration of the wrongdoing, and the harm that resulted."' 8
105. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2801.

106. Id. at 2811 (quoting the government's brief).
107. Id. (quoting 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965))
(citations omitted).
108. Lower courts have identified a variety of excessiveness factors such as
monetary value of property, extent of criminal activity, fact that property was a
residence, effect of forfeiture on innocent occupants. E.g., United States v. 9638
Chicago Heights, 27 F.3d 327, 331 (8th Cir. 1994). Courts appear divided over the
relevance of a proportionality test that would compare the value of the property forfeited
to the seriousness of the underlying crime. See, e.g., United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d
358, 365 (4th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the test but citing cases approving it). The Chandler
court summarized its approach as a three-part test:
[l]n determining excessiveness of an in rem forfeiture under the Eighth
Amendment. . . a court must apply a three part instrumentality test that
considers (1) the nexus between the offense and the property and the extent of
the property's role in the offense [a variation of this article's separate step
one], (2) the role and culpability of the owner [a variation of this article's
separate step two], and (3) the possibility of separating offending property that
can readily be separated from the remainder [a variation of this article's

19941

RUNAWAY CIVIL FORFEITURE

On such an analysis, the forfeiture of the yacht in Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co."o was excessive. Government authorities
seized a vessel which had been leased to users who brought a minute
quantity of marijuana on board. The corporate owner knew nothing of the
drugs and simply leased the yacht in the same commercially reasonable
way it had acted in the past." °
The yacht was seized as an
instrumentality, but it was neither integral to the crime nor was the
punishment visited upon the corportate owner proportionate to its
culpability, the duration of wrongdoing, or the harm done.
B. Substantive Due Process
Substantive due process analysis ordinarily proceeds along two tracks.
Almost all laws touching social and economic matters are judged under a
lenient rational-basis test, while laws that interfere with certain intimate
and personal rights, such as child rearing, marriage and divorce, and use
of contraceptives, are judged under a vigorous strict-scrutiny test."'
The rational basis test is easily satisfied. Ordinary social and economic
regulation is presumed constitutional, and so long as the law serves any
permissible police power objective, it will be upheld."11 Legislatures are
free to decide, without court interference, how they will tax, regulate, and
control behavior.
In contrast, strict scrutiny review requires the government to show a
substantial justification for its action and to prove that the law is narrowly
tailored to achieve the government's objectives without unnecessary
separate step one].
Id. at 364.
109. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
110. Id. at 692-93 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
111. This strict dichotomy appears to be collapsing in certain areas, such as in cases
involving the right of certain individuals to refuse treatment. See, e.g., Washington v.
Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1037 (1990) (applying a standard of reasonableness to a state's
requirement that an inmate be treated with antipsychotic drugs against his will).
112. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963) (concluding that "the
Kansas Legislature was free to decide for itself that legislation was needed to deal with
the business of debt adjusting"); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483,
487-88 (1955) (stating that "the law need not be in every respect logically consistent with
its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and
that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to
correct it.").
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interference with personal rights.11 3 The rationale for this heightened
judicial review flows principally from the idea that there are certain
choices which are so personal, so within a constitutionally implied and
specially protected
sphere of privacy, that interference warrants elevated
114
justification.
Given this dichotomy, and given that civil forfeiture affects not
personal privacy but economic and property rights, rare is the litigant who
bothers to raise a substantive due process challenge to a civil forfeiture
law. But, in certain circumstances, some forfeitures can apply so
disproportionately or so unreasonably that they may fail even the frail
rational basis test. More fundamentally, because forfeitures affect the
interests of property owners in a unique-and uniquely severe-way,
courts should stiffen the legislative justification for their use.
As to irrationality, the Court has never held that due process is
violated simply because the government confiscates the property of
persons innocent of any wrongdoing. Depending on the nature of the
property seized and the reason for seizing it, innocent owner forfeitures
can be quite rational. For example, if the government is seizing
contraband, it should be irrelevant that the owner is "innocent" because
contraband, by definition, may not be owned or possessed. Forfeitures
applied to innocent owners also are rational if the property is proceeds or
profits of a crime. As between the harm to the innocent party and closing
off avenues for criminals to launder their profits, a legislature may
choose, reasonably, to close off opportunities for the wrongdoers. The
legislature may conclude that third parties are frequently in a position to
consider whether the property they receive is the product of criminal
activity.115 In this regard the Supreme Court has turned aside arguments
that due process
prevents forfeiture of attorney's fees as traceable proceeds
116
of crime.
Yet forfeitures divesting innocent owners of property used or intended
to be used in the commission of a crime, that is, instrumentality forfeiture,
may be irrational. The Supreme Court acknowledged this possibility in
113. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIoNALLAW § 11.4,
at 371 (4th ed. 1991) ("a law or classification that impairs a fundamental right is subject
to 'strict scrutiny' and. . . the law, or classification, must be necessary or narrowly
tailored to promote a compelling or overriding interest").
114. See id.
115. E.g., United States v. 3100 N.E. 48th St., Unit 618, 871 F. Supp. 437, 443
(S.D. Fla. 1994) (holding that, to prove innocent ownership, the bail bond company must
show it conducted a reasonable investigation into the forfeitability of the defendant's

property).
116. See Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 622-23 (1989).
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the Calero-Toledo yacht seizure case. 7 Again, the yacht owner had no
complicity in and no knowledge about the lessee's possession of a small
amount of marijuana. Indeed, it did not even know the yacht had been
confiscated until it attempted repossession after the lessees failed to pay
the agreed upon rent."' The Calero-Toledo Court stated that forfeitures
serve punitive and deterrent purposes and that confiscation of property
from "innocent" owners "may have the desirable effect of inducing them
to exercise greater care in transferring possession of their property."' 19
Yet the Court also said that confiscation applied to "true innocents" would
go too far:
[I]t would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an
owner . . . who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and

unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all
that reasonably could be expected to prevent the prosecuted use

of his property; for, in that circumstance, it would be difficult to
conclude that forfeiture served legitimate purposes and was not
unduly oppressive.1t2

The Court voiced this same concern for the "truly innocent owner"

in Austin v. United States.12 '

But the Court's recognition that,

theoretically, some forfeitures of innocent owner property can be so
arbitrary as to violate due process has had little practical significance.

There are two principal explanations for this fact. First, many statutes,
including the drug forfeiture statute at issue in Austin, exempt innocent
owners.'
Second, courts have interpreted innocent owner defenses
very narrowly. 3 The owner must do all he reasonably can to prevent
117. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 685 (1974)
(discussing the possible severity of applying instrumentality forfeitures).
118. Id. at 693 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
119. Id. at 688.
120. Id. at 689-90 (footnote omitted).
121. 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2809 (1993) (explaining how the Court has considered
whether the forfeiture of a truly innocent owner's property would comport with due
process, but reserved the question because the forfeiture provision exempted innocent
owners).
122. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), (7) (1988) (indicating that exceptions under
the statute exist for innocent owners when a criminal act was "committed or ommitted
without the knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the owner").
123. See, e.g., United States v. Mercedes Benz 450 SEL, 657 F. Supp. 316, 319
(E.D. Mo. 1987) (holding that the innocent owner exception fails where the defendant
has not done "all that could reasonably be expected to prevent the proscribed use of the
... vehicle"); see also Michael Schecter, Fear and Loathing and the ForfeitureLaws,
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unlawful use of property and show, in effect, that he was powerless to
prevent the misuse of his property. Since it is virtually impossible to
prove that you could not have been a bit more cautious and attentive, the
defense can be quite hollow.
But forfeitures, because of their very nature, should have to jump a
higher hurdle than rationality. Recall that property seizures are not just
interferences with mere economic rights, and not mere regulations
affecting how we use our property or conduct our business affairs.
Forfeiture is the actual physical appropriation of property. The owner is
denied all right and title. His interests are expunged. Even in the area of
taxation, where extremely burdensome taxation is routinely upheld under
a rational basis review, the Court has signalled that taxation intended as
total confiscation of property will be looked at more critically. 1"
This total annihilation of interest, this expropriation, is precisely the
harm which inspired the Takings/Just Compensation Clause, and it is
appropriate to turn to that clause for guidance. Under takings doctrine a
physical taking of real property, even if minor, must be compensated."
The legislature cannot avoid paying compensation by claiming that the
property is essential to obtain a public benefit or that it must be acquired
to prevent a public harm."r
The rule is the same with so-called
regulatory takings which deprive an owner of all economically beneficial
use of his property. In its recent decision in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council," the Supreme Court explained that a legislature
75 CORNELL L. REv. 1151, 1180 (1990) (noting that, because of the narrowness of the
innocent owner defenses, they are rarely applicable and are insufficient to remedy the
harshness of forfeiture laws) (citing United States v. Mercedes Benz 380 SEL, 604 F.
Supp. 1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), af'd, 762 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1985).
124. See, e.g., City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974).
The Court upheld a 20% gross receipts tax on garages even though the measure was
extremely burdensome and operated to give a competitive advantage to public garages
which were not subject to the tax. Id. at 374-75. The Court said that tax laws do not
violate due process of law even if they render a business unprofitable and even if they
are "so excessive as to bring about the destruction of a particular business." Id. at 374.
Yet the Court went on to add that it would react differently if the tax was in reality a
confiscation of a business, that is, if the law was "'so arbitrary as to compel the
conclusion that it does not involve an exertion of the taxing power, but constitutes, in
substance and effect, the direct exertion of a different and forbidden power, as, for
example, the confiscation of property.'" Id. at 375 (quoting Magnano Co. v. Hamilton,
292 U.S. 40, 44 (1934)) (footnote omitted).
125. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 458 U.S. 419,441
(1982) (stating that, in the case of a taking, "the property owner retains a historically

rooted expectation of compensation.
126. Id. at 426.
127. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).

..
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cannot sidestep the takings consequences of confiscatory land regulation
by simply decreeing that such regulation was necessary to prevent harmful
use of the property." When regulation forces a property owner to
sacrifice all economically beneficial uses of his property, the only kay a
state can avoid compensation is by showing, in effect, that the prohibited
use could have been enjoined as a nuisance under existing state law. 1"
Such solicitude for real property ownership suggests that it is
appropriate for courts to examine critically any government action which
expropriates property. Critical examination requires invalidation unless
the government's program substantially advances important state interests.
Yet solicitude for the protection of real property seems to vanish when the
government acts under forfeiture laws. Why? Presumably the result in
Lucas should be the same even if the government styled its regulation as
a forfeiture. Otherwise, South Carolina could pass a statute making it
unlawful for any owner of parcels in "critical areas" of designated coastal
zones to permit their property to degrade or suffer erosion. The law
would provide that violation of the statute would result in forfeiture. If
this were permitted, South Carolina could have deprived Mr. Lucas of his
land more effectively than just telling him he could not build on it.
The chief obstacle to convincing courts to abandon their usual
deference to statutory authorized forfeiture is history. Forfeitures have
been permitted for more than 200 years, dating back to the beginning of
the republic and existing well before that. The Supreme Court canvassed
this history in both Calero-Toledo1" and Austin.
As the Court
explained, three kinds of forfeiture existed in England at the time the
Constitution was adopted: deodand, forfeiture upon conviction for a felony
or treason, and statutory forfeiture. 1 2 Deodand was forfeiture of objects
causing death, perhaps for retribution, superstition, religious reasons, or
because some fault needed expiation. 33 In biblical times, the offending
128. Id. at 2899.
129. See id. ("Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all
economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically
antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use
interests were not part of his title to begin with.").
130. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-83
(1974).
131. See Austin, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2806-08 (1993).
132. Id. at 2806.
133. See id.; Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680-81.
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item-the ox that gored a man-was destroyed. 11 Later, in England,
the item was forfeit to the Crown, and forfeitures became a source of
government revenues.135 Forfeitures for conviction of a crime were a
form of punishment of traitors and felons, and all of the offender's
property was confiscated. Neither deodand nor criminal forfeiture of
estate took hold in the United States.'3
The third form of forfeiture, statutory forfeiture, did take root in the
United States. "English law provided for statutory forfeitures of offending
objects used in violation of the customs and revenue laws." 1 37 Although
these early laws were "likely a product of the confluence and merger of
the deodand tradition and the belief that the right to own property could
be denied the wrongdoer," 3 1 the rationale of customs and tax laws,
particularly in admiralty, frequently was expressed in terms of giving
jurisdiction over a res (out of which payment could be extracted) and
providing a kind of liquidated
damages for evasion of duties or other
139
harms such as piracy.
Is this history conclusive of the validity of forfeiture and does it
preclude courts from giving modem forfeiture a close look? The Supreme
Court seemed to think so in the Calero-Toledo yacht forfeiture case.
Recall that the yacht's owner had no prior notice of the seizure and no
involvement with the illegal drugs found on board. Writing for the Court,
Justice Brennan rejected the owner's constitutional claim that the
summary, no-notice seizure violated procedural due process and its claim
that seizure of property of an innocent owner was a taking without
compensation and a violation of due process of law."4 Justice Brennan
turned aside the taking argument with a historical analysis. He pointed to
a "long line of prior decisions of this Court" as permitting the seizure of
property of innocent owners, discussed a number of them, and portrayed
134. See Exodus 21:28 (King James) ("If an ox gore a man or a woman, that they
die: then the ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of
the ox shall be quit."); see also Terrance G. Reed & Joseph P. Gill, RICO Forfeitures,
Forfeitable "Interests," and ProceduralDue Process, 62 N.C. L. Rv.57, 63 (1983);
Schwarcz & Rothman, supranote 29, at 290.
135. Schwarez & Rothman, supranote 29, at 290.
136. See U.S. CONsT. art. M, § 3, cl. 2 (prohibiting forfeiture of estate as a
punishment for treason "except during the Life of the Person attained"); Act of Apr. 30,
1790, ch. 9, § 24, 1 Stat. 117 (abolishing forfeiture of estate for felonies).
137. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682.

138. Id.
139. Piety, supra note 104, at 954-55.
140. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 679-80.
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the historical background as dispositive.141 But just as Calero-Toledo

now appears vulnerable to an excessive fines analysis, so, too, its
unblinking reliance on history is open to challenge.
First, courts in other contexts have said that an unbroken history of
injustice does not necessarily validate behavior.
In a variety of
circumstances the Court has said that analysis of constitutional rights does
not end with the observation that particular government practices have

been going on for a long time or that they have become familiar. Rather,
the Court should ascertain which values underlie certain constitutional
protections and ask whether current practices do and may legitimately
intrude upon those values. Again, the reality is that forfeiture applies

harshly and oppressively in some circumstances. It sweeps in, without
differentiation, property directly causing harm with property tangentially
connected to criminality. It sweeps in persons committing criminal acts
and the merely negligent or inattentive. Forfeiture, no matter if

historically rubberstamped by courts, should be seen for what it is and
judged under modem conceptions of due process.

This is, in effect, what the Court concluded in United States v. James

Daniel Good Real Property,42 in which a slim majority held that, absent

exigent circumstances, seizure of real property requires prior notice and
an opportunity to be heard."4u

Even Justice O'Connor, writing

separately to say that a seizure under warrant conveyed all of the due
process the property owner was entitled to, observed that the modem

procedural due process calculus governs forfeiture "notwithstanding its
historical pedigree." 1"

A fresh look at the reality of forfeiture and

141. Id. at 680. The precedents Justice Brennan discussed were Van Oster v.
Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926) (upholding a forfeiture under state law of an innocent
owner's interest in an automobile); J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254
U.S. 505 (1921) (holding that a forfeiture statute depriving an innocent owner of his
property did not violate the Fifth Amendment); Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96
U.S. 395 (1878) (rejecting assertions of innocence as a defense to a forfeiture of
property); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827) (holding that a conviction was not
a prerequisite to a proceeding to forfeit property).
142. 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
143. Id. at 505.
144. Id. at 513 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In a
separate opinion, however, Justice Rehnquist held fast to the historical line. See id. at
507-11 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He criticized the
majority's review of forfeiture under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), saying
the decision "departs from long standing historical precedent," and that it "casts doubts
upon long settled law relating to seizure of property to enforce income tax liability."
Good, 114 S. Ct. at 507 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He
called the majority's conclusions "ill-considered" and "disruptive."
Id. at 507
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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judging it by a contemporary understanding of constitutional law also
underlies the requiem for the fiction of "guilty property" in Austin.
But the notion that history settles the issue of court deference to
forfeitures is debatable on other grounds as well. Justice Thomas
suggested one such ground in his separate opinion in Good."
He
observed that modem civil forfeiture is a creature different not just in
degree but in kind from historical forfeiture. Although he, like Justice
O'Connor, believed that procedural due process was accorded in the
particular case, he added the following caution:
And like the majority, I am disturbed by the breadth of new civil
forfeiture statutes such as 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), which subjects
to forfeiture all real property that is used, or intended to be used,
in the commission, or even the facilitation, of a federal drug
offense. . . . [S]ince the Civil War we have upheld statutes
allowing for the civil forfeiture of real property. A strong
argument can be made, however, that § 881(a)(7) is so broad that
it differs not only in degree, but in kind, from its historical
antecedents. 14
Justice Thomas continued by saying that because current practice is
so far removed from its historical roots, "it may be necessary-in an
appropriate case-to reevaluate our generally deferential approach to
legislative judgments in this area of civil forfeiture. " 17
Finally, the history of forfeiture might be read to support, or at least
not to contradict, an active review by the courts. That is, when closely
examined, court deference to early forfeiture might be explained by the
obvious substantiality (if not the precise tailoring) of the government's
interests. The government plainly has a substantial interest in the seizure
of contraband and in preventing the circulation of forbidden items. 48
So, too, it clearly has a substantial interest in the efficient enforcement of
its tariff and trade laws and the collection of taxes and duties. Forfeiture
in its earliest applications was associated primarily with admiralty and the
need to proceed against vessels as a means of acquiring jurisdiction and
attaching property for the satisfaction and payment of fines. Although one
145. Id. at 515-17 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
146. Id. at 515 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote

omitted).
147. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
148. See, e.g., United States v. Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 364
(1984) ("[Keeping potentially dangerous weapons out of the hands of unlicensed dealers
is a goal plainly more remedial than punitive.").
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can easily over-rationalize the welter of forfeiture laws, there is a basis to
view early manifestations as resting on demonstrated need.

What if courts applied a form of heightened review to forfeiture?
What might the results be? Forfeitures would then be subject to close and

careful scrutiny.

They would be allowed only when the government

established that the forfeiture was carefully tailored to serve substantial

state purposes. Those purposes, as we have seen, relate to seizure of
contraband, seizure of proceeds, and seizure of property used in crime

either because it149is a harm in itself or because it operates to punish the

property owner.

A heightened due process analysis would have three components.
First, courts would strictly construe statutory bases for seizure and

require, as some now do, that the statutory basis for forfeiture be clearly

established. 1" Seizure would be limited to property clearly identified
as contraband, proceeds, or the integral instruments of crime. Laws
designed to confiscate the instruments of crime would be limited to
property substantially connected to the illegal activity. Broad-based
facilitation theories permitting seizure of property only remotely connected
to criminality would be rejected. Such an approach would doom, for
example, seizures of entire buildings, parcels of land, and businesses
where criminal activities occurred or contraband was found on only part
of the premises, or where the property was incidental to the occurrence of
the illegal activities. It also would invalidate, for example, the seizures
of entire farms including equipment and horses because the entire
operation gave an air of legitimacy to the criminal activities taking place
there."' Particularly close scrutiny would apply to seizures of real
estate and houses because of the special solicitude the law shows toward
149. See supra Part II.C.
150. See, e.g., United States v. 28 Emery St., 914 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1990)
(requiring a "substantial connection" between the property forfeited and the illegal
activity). However, such courts then apply the test to a broadly construed legislative
facilitation theory: "any property involved in illegal activity in a way which facilitates
that activity is forfeitable." United States v. $477,048.62, 754 F. Supp. 1467, 1473 (D.
Haw. 1991).
151. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 884 F.2d 544, 546 (holding that 27 quarter
horses were forfeitable because they lent an air of legitimacy to a horse farm used as a
site for drug dealing; the "cover" facilitated the illegal activity), reh'g denied, 889 F.2d
276 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1018 (1990). In addition, other cases
would have to be reconsidered. See, e.g., United States v. 1977 Lincoln Mark V.
Coupe, 643 F.2d 154, 157 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 818 (1981) (holding a car
forfeitable when its hood was raised and the scene served to deflect suspicion about the
defendant's activities); $477,048.62, 754 F. Supp. at 1472 (asserting that the entire bank
account was forfeitable because the legal money gave an air of legitimacy and "cover"
to laundering of the illegal money).
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such property and because "an individual's expectation of privacy and

freedom from governmental intrusion in the home merits special
constitutional protection."152
The second component of a heightened due process scrutiny would
complement the Eighth Amendment's protection against excessive fines.
As would be the case with an excessive fines analysis, the government

would be required to establish that particular seizures substantially served

the purposes of forfeiture law.153
Finally, a heightened substantive due process test would merge with

heightened procedural due process requirements." 5

That is, the

government would bear the burden of clearly proving both the statutory
basis for its forfeiture and a substantial connection between the property
forfeited and the purposes of the law. 55
IV.

PROCEDURAL RULES BASED ON REALITY

A. ProceduralDue Process
In its recent decision in United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Property,1" the Supreme Court held that forfeitures of property must
comply with procedural due process. 57
Specifically, the Court
concluded that, absent exigent circumstances, the due process clause
requires the government to afford notice and a meaningful opportunity to
152. United States v. 4492 S.Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258, 1264 (2d Cir. 1989),
reh'g denied, 897 F.2d 659 (1990).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 98-110.
154. See infra text accompanying notes 156-60.
155. Again, the continued vitality of the Calero-Toledo yacht case under either due
process or excessive fines scrutiny is doubtful. The yacht was not truly an instrument
of crime, only a convenient place for using drugs. The amount forfeited, the entire
yacht, was stunningly disproportionate to any culpability or inattention of the owners or
to any harm caused. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 665.
156. 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
157. The Court specifically rejected the government's argument that forfeitures need
only comply with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 500. Although the
Court affirmed the idea that the Fourth Amendment is a limitation on forfeiture
proceedings, it noted that the application of one constitutional provision to government
action does not preclude the applicability of another. See id. With forfeitures, the Court
noted, "the purpose and effect of the government's action in the present case go beyond
the traditional meaning of search or seizure. Here, the government seized property not
to preserve evidence of wrongdoing, but to assert ownership and control over the
property itself." Id.
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be heard before seizing real property."I In so concluding, the Court
applied the
now-familiar interest balancing approach of Mathews v.
1 9
Eldridge:5
The Mathews analysis requires us to consider the private interest
affected by the official action; the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of that interest through the procedures used, as well
as the probable value of additional safeguards; and the
Government's interest, including the administrative burden that
additional procedural requirements would impose."6
Measuring the significance of the Good decision is a puzzle. On the
one hand, the Court disregarded the relevance of a long history of judicial
acceptance of summary in rem proceedings. It thereby opened the door
to judging all forfeiture procedures under the modem due process
calculus. It applied its prior notice and hearing rules to all real property,
not just to houses or homes.
On the other hand, the actual protection extended to property owners
was quite modest. Prior notice and opportunity to be heard applies only
to real property. All other property, the Court readily concluded, is
automatically covered by the seize-first-answer-questions-later approach
of forfeiture."I And in the very same opinion expanding the reach of
due process protections, albeit modestly, the Court refused to dismiss the
forfeiture action because the government failed to comply with internal
statutory notification and reporting requirements." 6 If an action is filed
within the statutory five-year limitations period, as the case in Good barely
was, the Court will not imply a dismissal remedy from rules designed to
guide the internal discretion of government employees." 6 Although this
result was unremarkable by itself, the Court gave no signal that it was
troubled by the overall operation of forfeiture proceedings nor that it was
poised to reexamine the entire procedural construct of forfeitures.
158. Id. at 505.
159. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
160. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 501.
161. See id. The Court stated: "[Wie tolerate some exceptions to the general rule
requiring predeprivation notice .... " Id. However, the Court would not include real
property within these exceptions: "Good's right to maintain control over his home, and
to be free from governmental interference, is a private interest of historic and continuing
importance.... The seizure of a home produces a far greater deprivation than the loss
of furniture, or even attachment." Id.
162. Id. at 507.
163. Id.
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Were it to do so, the prime candidate for reconsideration would be the

burden of proof and the shifting of the burden of persuasion to the
property owner in forfeiture hearings. In federal and many state forfeiture

proceedings, the government can seize property when it has probable
cause to believe that the property was used or intended to be used to

commit crime. The property owner must then, usually within a stunningly
short period of time (ten to twenty days) file a notice that he wishes to
contest the forfeiture. At a hearing on the matter, the property owner (or
any other claimant of rights in the property) must shoulder the burden of

persuasion. He must prove by a preponderance of the evidence either that
the property was not contraband, proceeds, or the instrument of crime or,
as to proceeds and instrumentalities, that he gave value for the property
or was innocent of permitting it to be used for criminal ends. "'4

Forfeiture claimants have occasionally complained that the shift in the
burden of proof in forfeiture proceedings, at odds with ordinary civil
practice, is unfair and violates procedural due process. 1" The courts

have routinely shrugged off these objections, citing statutory authority and
long historical acceptance of the burden-shifting approach. 1" But if, as
Good indicates, history is no longer determinative and the interest

balancing of Mathews is the guide, the matter is open for reexamination.
164. The Supreme Court recently curtailed the "relation back" doctrine and
interpreted the statutory class of innocent owners to include all persons who acquired a
bona fide interest in property before seizure. United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113
S. Ct. 1126, 1134 (1993).
165. See, e.g., United States v. 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258, 1267-68 (2d
Cir. 1989), reh'g denied, 897 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1990) (rejecting appellant's argument
that the shifting of the burden of proof bypasses the safeguards of procedural rights
present at the trial pertaining to the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence); United States
v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1162-63 (2d Cir. 1986) (rejecting appellants'
contention that due process requires an "immediate post-seizure probable cause hearing
in advance of the forfeiture trial"); United States v. $2500, 689 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir.
1982), (rejecting appellant's argument that shifting the burden of proof violates due
process and constitutes criminal punishment), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099, reh'gdenied,
466 U.S. 994 (1984).
166. See, e.g., J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511
(1921) (indicating that acceptance of the burden shifting approach is too "firmly fixed"
in this country's jurisprudence to now be displaced); 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d at
1267-68 (rejecting appellant's argument that the absence of procedural safeguards-such
as the government's burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt-in civil
forfeiture proceedings requires the government to establish probable cause on the basis
of admissible evidence); United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1544 (4th Cir. 1989)
(declining to hold that burden shifting violates due process because other circuits reached
the same conclusion); see also Reed & Gill, supra note 134, at 87-92 (discussing the
different standards for the government's burden of proof in forfeiture cases, and arguing
that a clear and convincing standard is the most appropriate).
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Whether burden-shifting (and the standard of proof) raises a serious
due process issue depends on the parties' respective interests, the chance
of error, and who should bear the risk of a mistake being made. In
litigation between private parties, the custom is to allocate the burden to
the moving party on the theory that he is challenging the status quo. But,
as the Supreme Court concluded in a recent case, Concrete Pipe and
Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for
Southern California,'67 ordinarily the allocation "does not raise an issue
of due process.""
Concrete Pipe involved a business dispute in which an employer
challenged the amount of its statutory liability for withdrawing from a
multi-employer pension fund. Under the relevant statute, a trustee for the
pension fund, relying on the calculations of a professional actuary,
calculated the withdrawing employer's share of the plan's unfunded vested
benefits."6 The employer then shouldered the burden of proving the
assessment was unreasonable. The Court saw the stakes in such a scheme
to be quite modest. The employer's burden was only to "show that the
combination of methods and assumptions employed.., would not have
been acceptable to a reasonable actuary."' ° Indeed, the fight between
the parties was even narrower, because actuaries are constrained by
professional norms and standards and, therefore, the issue was reduced to
whether the actuary did or did not follow accepted practices.
"[A]t
least where the interests at stake are no more substantial than ... here"
the court said, due process was not offended by saddling the employer
with the burden of persuasion. 72
The due process calculation can change, however, when the stakes are
higher and, when, because the nature of the proofs is more open-ended
and complex, the risk of an inaccurate determination grows. In United
States v. Salerno,73 for example, the fact that the government provided
extensive procedural safeguards-including allocation of the burden to the
government and proof by clear and convincing evidence-was critical to
the Court's conclusion that preventative detention laws were
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
employed

113 S. Ct. 2264 (1993).
Id. at 2286.
See id. at 2272-73.
Id. at 2286.
See id. at 2272-73 (discussing the methods and standards which must be
by actuaries).

172. Id. at 2286.
173. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
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constitutional. 74 At stake was personal liberty and the outcome turned
on proof of future dangerousness, a slippery fact to establish.
The interests at stake in a forfeiture proceeding lie somewhere
between a narrow commercial dispute and the loss of personal liberty.
Superficially, one factor supporting shifting the burden to the property
owner is the rule that the party in the best position to know the facts
should be required to prove them. The property owner seems best
situated to prove that the property was not used in a criminal endeavor,
or that the property owner did not have any knowledge of the nature of
the property or how it was used. But a fuller appreciation of the realities
of a forfeiture proceeding suggests that the due process calibration may
require the government to prove improper use and lack of innocence.
The reality of forfeiture is that it is tied to criminal law violations.
The property owner effectively stands accused of either criminality
outright or indifference to it. The property owner thus risks the stigma
associated with engaging in or being connected to criminal activity.
Moreover, if the property owner is, in fact, implicated in criminality,
defense of one's property may require the sacrifice of the privilege against
self-incrimination. A property owner who invokes the privilege in a
forfeiture proceeding loses the beneficial use of the privileged
evidence. 75 Moreover, the factfinder may draw an adverse inference
from a party's refusal to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds. 76
The property owner also risks interests more important than mere
commercial obligations. Property is being taken and all rights to it are
lost. The property frequently includes real property and an individual's
home. As the Court has stated: the "right to maintain control over [one's]
home, and to be free from governmental interference, is a private interest
of historic and continuing importance." 1"
And, although the
government cannot finally extinguish one's rights in property absent an
initial showing of probable cause, the reality is that the case is decided
once the seizure takes place. Most people do not contest the forfeiture of
174. Id. at 755.
175. See, e.g., SEC v. Cymaticolor Corp., 106 F.R.D. 545,549 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(rejecting the contention that privileged evidence should not be precluded since it would
not result in any surprise at trial); Duffy v. Currier, 291 F. Supp. 810, 815 (D. Minn.
1968) (holding that a defendant is entitled to invoke the privilege against selfincrimination, but must accept its effect on the pending civil action).
176. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976). A property owner who fails
to invoke the privilege will lose it as waived, and the waiver will extend not just to the
civil proceeding but to any later criminal case. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 10
(1970).
177. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 501
(1993).
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their property. Perhaps this is because most such property owners are
guilty of using the property in illegal ways and sense futility, but many
may be deterred by the lopsided procedural advantages currently enjoyed
by the government. The property owner may make a base line cost-benefit
calculation that, given the odds, the property may not be worth efforts to
recover it. 17
It becomes particularly important to put the government to its proofs
if substantive due process and the protection against excessive fines are to
be effectively applied. Substantive due process and avoiding excessive
fines require the government to demonstrate a strong justification for

178. In testimony before Congress, Elvin L. Martinez, a Florida State
Representative, described the plight of the property owner who is stopped by police and
has his property seized:
I have heard much testimony in my role as chairman of the committee that
innocent citizens are being stopped on highways based upon a so-called "drug
smuggler's profile." The vast majority of these citizens are either Hispanic or
Black.
More often than not these individuals are being stopped on the pretext of
having committed some minor traffic offense; the kind of offense which would
ordinarily go unnoticed by the officer and for which motorists are rarely
ticketed. Once stopped, these citizens are being stripped of their property
based upon determinations of probable cause that frequently would not
withstand judicial scrutiny. Please note that, because forfeiture is civil in
nature, the standards for determining probable cause are much lower than they
would be in a criminal proceeding. These citizens are being denied the
procedural safeguards that we have come to expect as citizens of a democracy,
where innocence is still the presumption.
Because of the high cost of contesting seizures or because of the time
constraints involved (a significant number of these persons reside in other
states and do not have the resources to wait out these legal highwaymen), these
citizens are being coerced into accepting lopsided settlements which result in
financial windfalls to law enforcement agencies at the expense of persons
whose only crime is traveling on the nation's highways. Moreover, the
procedures for securing the return of seized property are unduly burdensome,
and often result in waste to non-monetary assets.
Dept. of JusticeAsset ForfeitureProgram:Hearing Before the Legislationand National
Security Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. 102-03 (1992) (written statement submitted by Elvin L. Martinez).
One press investigation into California seizures reported that in more than 6000
forfeiture cases filed by local prosecutors in 1992, 94% involved the seizure of less than
$5000. Inequity Seen in Drug ForfeitureLaw, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 3, 1993, at A17. The

article quotes a forfeiture lawyer: "If it's less than a couple of thousand dollars, I tell
people not to bother unless they've got some kind of iron-clad proof. And usually, when
it's cash, you don't have it." Id. As the article correctly notes, the burden is on the
property owner to prove they obtained the seized assets legally by producing bank
statements or receipts. See id.
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forfeiture and to prove a proportionate and tailored application in each
case. In this area, substantive and procedural due process overlap and
complement each other.'"9
Indeed, it may be a mistake to single out this or that procedure in a
forfeiture regime and consider whether procedural due process is satisfied.
It is the aggregate effect of forfeiture proceedings-summary seizures,
minimalist government justification, shifting of burdens, unreasonable
time
limits for contesting forfeitures, generous time limits for prosecuting them,
readily invoked default rules, and bond posting requirementsl-which
combine to make the process unfair. The Supreme Court of Florida
recognized this when it set forth, under Florida constitutional law, the
minimum procedural
requirements necessary to make the entire process
181
of forfeiture fair.
The Florida high court concluded that "[i]n forfeiture proceedings the
state impinges on basic constitutional rights of individuals who may never
have been formally charged with any civil or criminal wrongdoing.""
At stake, it said, are basic property rights including the special property
and privacy interests in a home. Moreover, it found that the forfeiture
remedy is a particularly harsh intrusion on those rights. 1" Therefore:
"Due proof" under the [state forfeiture] Act constitutionally
means that the government may not take an individual's property
in forfeiture proceedings unless it proves, by no less than clear
and convincing evidence, that the property being forfeited was
used in the commission of a crime . . . Forfeiture must be
limited184to the property or portion thereof that was used in the
crime.
The Florida court recognized an innocent owner defense, but required the
property owner to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he had
179. See supra text accompanying notes 98-110, 156-60.
180. For an overview of forfeiture procedures, see KESSLER, supranote 1, §§ 2.01
to 2.05, at 2-1 to 2-13; David J.Taube, Note, Civil Forfeiture, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1025, 1031-45 (1993). Some courts compound these harsh procedures by readily finding
waivers of rights and strictly applying procedural requirements. See, e.g., United States
v. Three Parcels of Real Property, 43 F.3d 388 (8th Cir. 1994) (upholding the trial
court's order to strike a pro se claimant's claim for lack of compliance with the pleading
rules and concluding that any right to a pre-seizure hearing was waived).
181. Departmentof Law Enforcementv. Real Property, 588 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1991).
182. Id. at 967.
183. See id. at 961 (stating that because "forfeitures are considered harsh
exactions," forfeiture statutes should be strictly construed).
184. Id. at 968 (citations omitted).
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no knowledge that the property was being used for criminal purposes. 1 5
The court also prescribed procedures for the restraint of property, filing
deadlines, notice of forfeiture, and so on. 86
B. Forfeiture Paybacks to Law Enforcement-EliminatingBias
and the Appearance of Impropriety
Law enforcement benefits directly from seizing assets through
forfeiture. On the federal level, the Department of Justice Asset
Forfeiture Program reported that, in 1992 net deposits to the Asset
Forfeiture Fund equalled $531 million.'" In 1993 net deposits totaled
$555.7 million. 8 Since 1985, deposits to the fund have topped $3.2
billion."
Even this amount, however, does not reflect the full
dimension of the sums the Federal Government has obtained through
forfeiture. The Justice Department may elect to put forfeited assets
directly into service. In 1993 alone, approximately $12.8 million worth
of cars, boats, planes and other property were retained for official use by
the Drug Enforcement Administration, the FBI, and other agencies."
In addition, the federal government may transfer forfeited property to
other federal agencies or state and local law enforcement agencies. In
1993, approximately $10.2 million was so transferred.191 Finally, not
all federal agencies deposit money into the Asset Forfeiture Fund. Again,
using 1993 figures, about $1.6 million went directly to the U.S. Marshals
Service, and more money went to other federal agencies." 9 Monies
from the fund are used for a variety of programs, including paying the
salaries of U.S. Attorneys, providing money to state and local law
enforcement agencies, and support for federal prisons. 1" Millions are
spent on forfeiture-related expenses, including large payments to informants. 194
185. See id.
186. Id. at 967.
187. 1993 ANNuAL REPORT, supranote 14, at 38.
188. Id.
189. Id. at5.
190. Id. at 17.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See id. at 15.
194. The Forfeiture Enabling Statute specifically permits forfeiture assets to be used
to pay informants. 28 U.S.C. § 524 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The Statement of
Operations and Changes in Net Position for fiscal year ended September 30, 1993, lists
payments for "Awards for Information" at $27,619,000. 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 14, at 64. The report does not, however, include the precise amount of federal
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State and local jurisdictions have developed their own forfeiture
programs and have acquired millions in cash and property. The total

amount of forfeited assets from all jurisdictions is unknown.

Press

accounts in various states have revealed, however, that huge sums can be

confiscated. 1"

For example, between 1989 and 1992, the Sheriff's

Office in Volusia County, Florida, seized $8 million in cash in roadside

stops of motorists."9 Although the office returned about half the money
to property owners in settlements, it still netted about $4 million over the
three-year period."
It is appropriate to ask what influence all of this money and property

has had on law enforcement behavior and whether law enforcement's
direct and substantial pecuniary interest in the outcome of forfeiture raises
a due process concern?
With the stakes so high, law enforcement agencies have sometimes
become adversaries in pursuing forfeitable property. When more than one
agency has participated in an investigation leading to forfeiture, there have

been jurisdictional squabbles over who is entitled to keep what property

and how proceeds are to be divided. The federal government has tried to

impose some degree of harmony and cooperation among state and local
1

agencies,
but where a division of spoils is at issue, some agencies
have refused to cooperate and have even obstructed pursuit of cases in
order to win control over forfeited assets."9 Sometimes federal sharing
programs have exacerbated tensions by making cooperation with the
funds shared with states used for this purpose.
195. See supra notes 14-27 and accompanying text (describing how profitable
forfeiture is). One press account observed:
Even small amounts can loom large in cash-strapped police departments.
Virginia's Forfeited Asset Sharing Program has netted $1.5 million for state
and local law enforcement agencies since it was launched in July 1991, with
about $100,000 a month now being distributed locally. The program has been
described as most helpful to rural police departments.
Richard Miniter, Property Seizures on Trial, INsioHT, Feb. 22, 1993, at 10.
196. Jeff Brazil & Steve Berry, Color of Driver is Key to Stops in 1-95 Videos,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 23, 1992, at A-1, A-10; Jeff Brazil & Steve Berry, Tainted
Cash or Easy Money?, ORLANDO SENTiNE, June 14, 1992, at A-1, A-16 [hereinafter
Tainted Cash].
197. Brazil & Berry, Tainted Cash, supranote 196, at A-16.
198. See, e.g., Mike Moore& Jim Mood, The Challengeto States Posedby Federal
Adoptive Drug Forfeitures, CIVIL R.MBDmS INDRUG ENFORCEMENT REP., (National
Ass'n of Att'ys; Gen., Washington, D.C.), June-July 1992, at 2.
199. See id.
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federal government more lucrative than cooperation with state
agencies.2
The seizure of expensive homes, luxury cars, planes, and other assets
has also tempted some law enforcement agencies to put property to use in
corrupt or questionable ways. Forfeited property has paid for tennis club
memberships for high-ranking law enforcement officials, provided
expensive vehicles for personal use by prosecutors, and been sold for a
fraction of its price to persons having ties to law enforcement
personnel. 20'
Most troubling and most relevant to due process considerations,
however, is growing evidence that the ease and profitability of forfeiture
have refocused law enforcement away from apprehension and investigation
of criminals to grabbing property. Former New York City Police
Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy told Congress that "[the large
monetary value of forfeitures... has created a great temptation for state
and local police departments to target assets rather than criminal
activity."'
As one example, Murphy told of Florida drug agents who
work the 1-95 "cocaine corridor." The agents stop suspicious vehicles on
only the southbound lanes, reasoning that those traveling south are more
likely to have drug proceeds or cash and those traveling north are more
likely to have the drugs." Law enforcement can spend the forfeitable
cash; it must destroy contraband drugs.
The significance of pursuing forfeiture for revenue is reflected hi a
1990 memo in which the Attorney General of the United States exhorted
United States Attorneys to increase forfeitures in order to meet Justice
Department budgetary targets: "We must significantly increase production
to reach our budget target ....
Failure to achieve the $470 million
projection would expose the Department's forfeiture program to criticism
and undermine confidence in our budget projections. Every effort must
200. See id. The federal program allows local agencies to turn over their forfeiture
cases to the federal government. Once the federal government "adopts" a local seizure,
the federal government subtracts minimal expenses and returns about 85 % of the amount
to the local law enforcement department. By this method, departments have been able
to evade state legislative and constitutional requirements to pay forfeited amounts into the
state treasury. See United States v. Wmston-Salem/Forsyth County Bd. of Educ., 902
F.2d 267, 272-73 (4th Cir. 1990) (federal adoption permissible even when local law
enforcement agency is able to avoid state constitutional rule to pay all fines, penalties,
and forfeitures toward support of free public schools).
201. See Jon Nordheimer, Prosecutorsare Reined in on Seizing Crimes' Assets,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1992, at 50 (describing allegations against Somerset County, New
Jersey, Prosecutor Nicholas L. Bissell, Jr.).
202. Richard Miniter, Ill-Gotten Gains, REAsON, Aug.-Sept. 1993, at 32, 34.
203. Id.
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be made to increase forfeiture income during the remaining three months
of 1990."1
Police actively have set out to create criminal opportunities in order
to forfeit property, and they have pursued weak and questionable
cases.'
For example, police departments have set up sting operations

in which they sell drugs to passers-by in automobiles and then seize the
cars.' No criminal charges are brought; the objective is to obtain the
property. Police have targeted individuals with expensive homes and used
flimsy bases to conduct searches, hoping to find drugs.'
Using drug
courier profiles, police stop people in cars or airports or bus stations. If

the person has a large amount of cash, the police seize it as "drug

proceeds" and leave it to the owner to try to get it back.2 '

Courts have taken note of the government's "direct pecuniary interest
in the outcome of [forfeiture] proceeding[s]."'

Judges' unease with

payback arrangements has led them, in some instances, to look more
closely at the basis of a forfeiture or the adequacy of the procedures used
to effect it.210
No court, however, has found that payback
arrangements, by themselves, violate due process of law. Although due

process is compromised if a judge has, or appears to have, a direct
204. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 502 n.2
(1993) (quoting 38 U.S. ATr'Ys' BULL. 180 (1990)).
205. Government informants who are sometimes paid a percentage of the amounts
forfeited through their efforts, are wise enough to set up drug deals in homes or cars
rather than on the street. See, e.g., United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d
29, 32 (2d Cir.) (indicating that the government requested that the illegal transaction take
place inside the property which was later seized), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 55 (1992).
206. Strasser, supra note 27, at 26.
207. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 46, 1.02, at 1-23 (describing a case involving
a ranch valued at between three and five million dollars).
208. See, e.g., Jeff Brazil & Steve Berry, 'ICould Win the Battle but Lose the
War,' ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 15, 1992, at A-6 (reporting a case in which police
seized life savings of $38,923 from a man who got back most of his money in a
settlement whereby the Sheriff's Office kept $10,000 and the man's lawyer received onethird of his recovery); Miniter, supra note 202, at 3.
209. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492,502 (1993)
(footnote omitted).
210. See, e.g., id. (government's pecuniary interest buttressed the Court's
conclusion that prior notice and a hearing are necessary before seizure of real property).
But see Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 629 (1989) (dismissing the
government's self-interest in arguing against the seizure of proceeds in the hands of a
defendant's attorney).

19941

RUNAWAY CIVIL FORFEiURE

personal or pecuniary interest in the outcome of a case, 211 police and
prosecutors are not similarly disabled. The theory is that police and law
enforcement authorities only initiate action, they do not judge it. As the
Court stated in Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc. :212 "rigid requirements . . .
designed for officials performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions are
not applicable to those acting in a prosecutional or plaintiff-like
capacity." 213 In Marshall, the court relied on the differing roles of
prosecutor and judge to uphold civil penalties assessed by an
administrative official.214 Under the relevant law, sums collected as
penalties were returned to the administrative agency as reimbursement for
its costs of litigating. The Court looked closely at the reimbursement
scheme and concluded that there was no "realistic possibility" it would
distort judgment in the case.2" 5
There are two reasons to fear, however, that the distorting influence
of monetary rewards does carry over from law enforcement's initial
seizure to a court's final judgment. First, for many people, the forfeiture
seizure is tantamount to a forfeiture judgment. There will be no adversary
proceeding because the claimant knows that, procedurally, the deck is
stacked against him. Or, in many cases, the amount forfeited may not be
worth the cost of the contest. Finally, the pressure to settle may be
overwhelming.
Not only can prosecutors bargain from procedural
advantages which leave the claimant without use of his property and an
uphill battle, they also can throw in promises not to prosecute for an
underlying crime.21 6 In some instances, the whole arrangement has
about it the air of "let's make a deal," or worse, undue coercion. And,
presumably, the more valuable the property, the greater the potential for
coercion.
211. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 824-25 (1986)
(examining the factors necessary to constitute an interest in the outcome of the case, and
holding that the "tidy sum" ($30,000) received by the judge as a settlement in a separate
case was "sufficient to establish the substantiality of his interest" in the Lavoie suit);
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531-32 (1927) (invalidating an Ohio procedure under
which half of all criminal fines imposed by the mayor sitting as judge were paid to the
mayor and township for their costs).
212. 446 U.S. 238 (1980).
213. Id. at 248.
214. Id. at 248-49.
215. Id. at 250.
216. As one observer noted, mandatory sentences and steep prison terms have
"created powerful incentives for criminals to take any steps [such as agreeing to
forfeiture] to avoidjail." Use ofSnitches out of Control, Study Finds, L.A. TIMEs, Feb.
13, 1995, at 21A.
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A second concern is that, even if a forfeiture is tested at a hearing, the
shifting of the burden of proof to the claimant may effectively insulate a
seizure from meaningful scrutiny.
The government, once having
established the existence of bare-bones probable cause, effectively enjoys
a presumption that its actions were correct.
The Supreme Court analyzed a similar burden-shifting process in the
recent Concrete Pipe commercial dispute case.21 7
Concrete Pipe
objected to the procedures under which it was assessed liability for
withdrawing from a group pension plan. 218 The procedures permitted
the trustee for the plan, a person with obvious bias, to make the initial
assessment of the employer's liability.219 Thereafter, the employer could
contest the assessment in a de novo hearing before an arbitrator. Concrete
Pipe argued that because the statutory assessment was presumed correct
unless the employer proved otherwise, the bias of the trustee was
preserved in the later hearing.'
The Court acknowledged the substantiality of the issue and noted that
courts of appeal were divided over how to resolve it. 1 Nevertheless,
the Court held that, because no issues of law were presumed correct and
because no factual issue was foreclosed from effective rehearing, the
scheme was constitutional. 2 The precise test of Concrete Pipe is
unclear. On the one hand, the Court appeared to endorse an inquiry
focused on whether an initially biased determination operated to foreclose
fair and effective consideration of factual issues at a later adversary
hearing. 3 Due process would be violated only if a procedure operated
as a bar that froze the initial decision (the "bar test"). On the other hand,
the Court suggested that a procedure could violate due process if the
initially biased determination made it appreciably more difficult to prove
one's case at a later hearing.'
Under such an approach, the Court
would look at the nature of the issues at stake and the difficulty of later
proving the relevant facts (the "burden test").
If the bar test applies, then the bias of forfeiture paybacks combined
with a shift in burden to the forfeiture claimant will not violate due
process. The claimant can, at the later forfeiture hearing, raise and
217. 113 S. Ct. 2264 (1993).
218. Id. at 2270.
219. Id. at 2272-74. The procedures are part of the Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208.
220. Concrete Pipe, 113 S. Ct. at 2276.
221. Id. at 2278 n.13.
222. Id. at 2283.
223. Id. at 2277.
224. Id. (quoting Wilthrow v. Larkin, 95 S. Ct. 1456, 1470 (1975)).
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adduce proofs on all aspects of the forfeiture and even do so before a jury
in many instances. There is no foreclosure as such. If, however, the
burden test applies, then forfeiture pay back schemes may taint the
fairness of certain forfeitures. In Concrete Pipe, the matter was merely
a commercial dispute over whether the amount of liability was determined
in accordance with sound actuarial practice. No burden was placed on the
company's ability to raise a challenge to the actuary's methods. The
matter was straightforward and narrowly circumscribed. In forfeiture
cases, however, the interests are complete loss of property, and the proofs
may be complex and difficult. The proof goes to whether a person did or
did not engage in or facilitate criminal activity and whether, to what
degree, and to what extent particular property was connected to that

criminality.
In some cases, the burden of proof might be virtually impossible to
discharge. Consider the seizure of cash from a traveler who meets a
"drug courier profile"I or who is simply a person identified as a drug
dealer by an informant. Shifting the burden to the individual to prove his
money is not drug proceeds and that he is not a drug dealer is difficult and
manifestly unfair. In other cases, unfairness in burden-shifting may not
matter. If the police seize a business as a situs of drug operations after
observing repeated sales, finding a cache of drugs on the premises,'
and arresting the owner for direct participation in the activity, burdenshifting will not likely be a serious impediment to a fair and unbiased
assessment of evidence at the forfeiture hearing.
In the end, however, it is unclear whether there will be few or many
cases in which bias or the appearance of bias carries over from the initial
seizure to an adjudication of forfeiture. It will be difficult to establish that
forfeiture paybacks, even if a bad idea, are facially unconstitutional.
Therefore, in this area at least, reform may have to come from the
legislature.227
225. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1989) (describing the
factors that caused the DEA to have a reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant on drug
charges); Daniel R. Browing, Is Drug War ErodingRights? 'Profile' Use for Arrests
Worries Some, ST. LouIs POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 30, 1989, at lB.
226. Similar facts led to forfeiture in United States v. 427 & 429 Hall St., 842 F.
Supp. 1421 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
227. Indeed on June 15, 1993, Representative Henry J. Hyde introduced a bill to
reform civil asset forfeiture law at the federal level by placing the burden of proof on the
government instead of the subject of the forfeiture and by authorizing appointment of
counsel for indigent claimants. H.R. 2417, 103d Cong., 1st SeSs. §§ 5, 6 (1993) (Civil
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act); see also S. 1655, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (the Senate
counterpart to Representative Hyde's proposal introduced by Senator Jeffords on
November 10, 1993). Representative Hyde and Senator Jeffords have, however, faced
resistance. The Department of Justice successfully lobbied to keep forfeiture reform out
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V. CONCLUSION

In recent cases, the Supreme Court has shown a new willingness to
confront the injustices associated with civil asset forfeiture. The Court
already has drawn some boundary lines based on the Excessive Fines
Clause and modem procedural due process requirements.
Most
importantly, the Court has demonstrated that is prepared to put aside the
legal fictions associated with forfeiture and to examine critically the
historical rationales on which it is based.
The reality is that forfeiture is a harsh, oppressive, and sometimes
disproportionate and irrational remedy. It may be appropriate to rely upon
forfeiture in some circumstances in which it can be wisely and effectively
deployed, but forfeiture also can work extreme injustice. The Constitution
provides a familiar test to distinguish between these disparate outcomes:
the government must fairly prove that particular forfeitures substantially
serve legitimate state interests. This article has identified how the
Excessive Fines and Due Process clauses might be more fully developed
to force governments to do just that. Of course, not every unfairness
associated with forfeiture can necessarily be policed by the Constitution.
Paybacks of forfeiture money to law enforcement, for example, are likely
to survive a direct constitutional challenge. In this and other areas of
forfeiture practice, comprehensive reform ultimately lies with the bodies
that unleashed and successively broadened this runaway remedy-Congress
and the state legislatures.

of the 1994 Omnibus Crime Act and opposed Representative Hyde's 1993 bill despite a
56-member bipartisan coalition for forfeiture reform. See Robert E. Bauman, Take It
Away, NAT'L Rav., Feb. 20, 1995, at 34, 38.

